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While the portrait of a trial has traditionally been painted as a single
proceeding that determines all of the relevant issues, bifurcated proceedings
are those in which some issues or claims are separated. Federal and state
courts generally have the authority to bifurcate proceedings in their
discretion. The North Carolina General Assembly, however, recently passed
a law that limits a judge’s discretion and institutes a presumption in favor of
bifurcation. This statute is the first of its kind in the country and is a
significant change in trial procedure. Other states are already considering
similar legislative reforms. The issue rekindles important policy questions
including the role of legislatures in governing judicial proceedings and the
leveraging power of corporate defendants. This Article discusses the
implications of such legislative reform and concludes that more research is
necessary to determine the value of bifurcation. Using North Carolina state
and federal cases as an example, as well as a discussion of the practical and
policy consequences of bifurcated proceedings, the Article argues that
bifurcation decisions should be placed within the trial court’s discretion
rather than with the legislature.
I.

INTRODUCTION

The process is inherently so absurd, so at variance with the procedure
followed in investigations in every other department of life, that only our
lifelong inurement to it makes it possible for us to accept it without
question.1

1. Lewis Mayers, The Severance for Trial of Liability from Damage, 86 U. PA. L. REV.
389, 389 (1938).
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Professor Lewis Mayers, the author of the above quotation, was not
talking about obtaining a judicial clerkship or deciding which law school
to attend. Professor Mayers was talking about the practice of trying the
issues of liability and damages simultaneously, in one judicial
proceeding. The traditional concept of a trial, at least in the civil
context, consists of one proceeding in which the jury determines
whether the defendant is liable and, if so, the amount of money to which
the plaintiff is entitled. However, the modern trend is moving away
from a unitary proceeding and instead moving toward dividing a trial
into two components, a procedure referred to as bifurcation.2 More
generally, something is bifurcated when it is “[f]orked or divided into
two parts or branches, as the . . . tongues of snakes.”3 It is that
procedure for which Professor Mayers was advocating in the context of
civil jury trials.
While historically the civil trial did consist of one proceeding,
recent decades have seen an increasing trend in bifurcation. In
bifurcated proceedings, judges separate out certain issues or claims,
purportedly for the purpose of having a more manageable trial.4 The
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure5 and almost every state6 permit a trial
judge to bifurcate proceedings in his or her discretion.7 However, state
legislatures (largely as a result of influential corporate lobbyists) are
seeing increasing requests to enact legislation that allows for more
bifurcated proceedings. The North Carolina General Assembly recently
expedited this trend by creating a statutory presumption in favor of
bifurcation.8 Under this law, passed as part of a medical liability reform
2. Meiring de Villiers, A Legal and Policy Analysis of Bifurcated Litigation, 2000
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 153, 155.
3. AMERICAN HERITAGE SCIENCE DICTIONARY 68 (Houghton Mifflin Co. 2005).
4. 75 AM. JUR. 2D Trial § 83 (2007).
5. FED. R. CIV. P. 42(b) (“For convenience, to avoid prejudice, or to expedite and
economize, the court may order a separate trial of one or more separate issues, claims,
crossclaims, counterclaims, or third-party claims.”).
6. Most states have provisions in their rules of civil procedure that model the
federal rule, although the actual language varies widely. See, e.g., ALA. R. CIV. P. 42(b)
(“The court, in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice, or when separate trials
will be conducive to expedition and economy, may order a separate trial of any claim,
cross-claim, counterclaim, or third-party claim, or of any separate issue or of any number
of claims, cross-claims, counterclaims, third-party claims, or issues . . . .”); 735 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 5/2-1006 (2008) (“An action may be severed . . . as an aid to convenience,
whenever it can be done without prejudice to a substantial right.”).
7. 75 AM. JUR. 2D Trial § 83.
8. Act of July 25, 2011, No. 400, sec. 2, § 1A-1, Rule 42(b), 2011 N.C. Sess. Laws
1712, 1713.
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statute, a judge is instructed to separate the issue of liability from the
issue of damages unless the opposing party can show good cause for a
unitary proceeding.9 This standard is one-of-a-kind in statutory law and
actually contradicts much of what other courts and theorists have said
regarding the propriety of bifurcation.
The benefit of such a legislative mandate remains to be seen. The
intent of this Article is to ask whether such a drastic change was
properly researched or will ultimately prove helpful—for judges,
plaintiffs, or defendants. A statutory provision in favor of bifurcation
seems to accept the argument that “juries are simply incapable,
statistically, of following instructions and that the time-tested method of
submitting all the evidence to one jury in a personal injury suit should
be abandoned.”10 Those calling for legislative reform, including those in
the North Carolina General Assembly, have not provided any support
for this argument, and other states would do well to analyze whether
this argument has merit.
To that end, this Article discusses the role of bifurcation in modern
jurisprudence, with North Carolina serving as a self-proclaimed
laboratory. Part II presents a brief history of bifurcation, its role in
criminal and civil cases, and the new law’s effect on that role. Part III
then compares those positions with the presence of bifurcation in federal
proceedings. Part IV discusses the effects of a legislative presumption in
favor of bifurcation, ranging from evidentiary implications to policy
justifications. Finally, Part V provides a proposed standard to apply
under such a statutory presumption and provides a standard for other
state legislatures considering such a change. In the end, the thesis
remains the same: a statutory presumption in favor of bifurcation
requires more research and contemplation than has been evidenced thus
far.
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF BIFURCATION: ONE STATE’S EXAMPLE
Bifurcation is not a new concept in criminal or civil jurisprudence,
but it is gaining increasing attention in both spheres. Although the
practice of bifurcation has been around for centuries, judges have been
reluctant to encourage its expansion.11 In North Carolina specifically,
bifurcation has slowly been gaining adhesion in both criminal and civil
9. See id.
10. Snoznik v. Jeld-Wen, Inc., No. 1:09cv42, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35308, at *3
(W.D.N.C. Apr. 1, 2009). Notably, the court rejected that argument. Id. at *4.
11. Mayers, supra note 1, at 391–93.
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cases.12 North Carolina’s new law, however, takes this growth to a
whole new level.
A. History of Bifurcation Generally
At common law, it was relatively common to see a two-stage trial
for a limited number of specific types of actions.13 According to
Professor Mayers, for example, the claim of account-render was
traditionally separated into two portions: first, to determine whether the
defendant had an obligation to account for a balance due and, second, to
determine the amount that the plaintiff was owed.14 Even at that time,
however, separate trials were not very common for most types of
litigation.15 When Professor Mayers was writing in 1938, he found it “at
least arguable that, without any express statutory or other authorization,
our courts . . . have the inherent power to sever any issue for separate
trial.”16 Still, even though some jurisdictions (including England and the
state of New York) had statutory provisions permitting bifurcation, such
a procedure was seldom used.17
Thus, bifurcation, in the sense of the term as used in this Article, is
essentially a creature of the last eighty years. The earliest reference to
the term “bifurcation” in twentieth-century litigation appears in two
1928 dissenting opinions from the Supreme Court of California.18
However, the option of separating the liability and damages portions of
trials began to gain momentum even without the term “bifurcation.”19
The Supreme Court of the United States eventually started using the

12. See, e.g., Roberts v. Young, 464 S.E.2d 78, 82 (N.C. Ct. App. 1995) (noting the
importance of bifurcation and quoting the legislative comment to Rule 42: “the power of
severance is an indispensable safety valve to guard against the occasion where a suit of
unmanageable size is thrust on the court”).
13. Mayers, supra note 1, at 391.
14. Id.
15. W.G.V., Note, Original Separate Trials on Issues of Damages and Liability, 48 VA.
L. REV. 99, 101 (1962).
16. Mayers, supra note 1, at 396.
17. Id. at 396–98. For additional history of the practice of bifurcation, see Judge
Jack Weinstein’s opinion in Simon v. Philip Morris Inc., 200 F.R.D. 21 (E.D.N.Y. 2001).
18. People v. Fook, 273 P. 779, 786 (Cal. 1928) (Preston, J., dissenting); People v.
Troche, 273 P. 767, 774 (Cal. 1928) (Preston, J., dissenting).
19. See, e.g., State Wholesale Grocers v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., No. 56 C 418,
1956 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4051, at *6 (N.D. Ill. June 21, 1956) (ordering the issues to be
“separated”).
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term in the 1960s.20 The term entered North Carolina jurisprudence
shortly thereafter.21 Federal courts were given formal authority in 1966
to “order a separate trial of one or more separate issues, claims,
crossclaims, counterclaims, or third-party claims.”22 North Carolina
courts were given similar authority the following year.23 “The 1970s was
marked by the continuing, if slow, growth of bifurcation decisions and
the accelerating use of bifurcation within claims . . . .”24 Since then,
bifurcation has become increasingly common in both criminal and civil
cases.25
B. Bifurcation in North Carolina Criminal Cases
Before the 1970s, the normal practice in North Carolina was to
establish guilt and a sentence in the same criminal trial.26 Defendants’
attempts to seek bifurcation were rebutted.27 In State v. Sanders, for
example, the Supreme Court of North Carolina rejected such an
argument.28 At that time, North Carolina courts consistently relied on
the one-proceeding model espoused in the sentencing statute of the
day.29 The court also quoted the Supreme Court of the United States,
which stated that “[t]wo-part jury trials are rare in our jurisprudence;
they have never been compelled by this Court as a matter of
20. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 90–91 (1963) (noting that the criminal
defendant had a bifurcated trial); Hewitt-Robins, Inc. v. E. Freight-Ways, Inc., 371 U.S.
84, 85 n.* (1962) (explaining that the litigation had been bifurcated into two district
courts).
21. See State v. Spence, 155 S.E.2d 802, 809 (N.C. 1967) (explaining that the
defendant had moved to bifurcate the issue of insanity from his homicide trial), vacated
by 392 U.S. 649 (1968).
22. FED. R. CIV. P. 42(b); see Act of Nov. 6, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-773, 62 Stat. 961
(establishing the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
23. Act of June 27, 1967, No. 954, sec. 1, § 1A-1, Rule 42(b), 1967 N.C. Sess. Laws
1274, 1317.
24. Stephan Landsman et al., Be Careful What You Wish For: The Paradoxical Effects
of Bifurcating Claims for Punitive Damages, 1998 WIS. L. REV. 297, 304.
25. See, e.g., Marshall v. Williams, 574 S.E.2d 1, 4 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002) (affirming
the trial court’s decision to bifurcate a civil case, sua sponte, “for the purpose of judicial
economy, for the ease of understandability and presentation to the jury, and again after
lengthy consideration of the best presentation of this matter”).
26. See, e.g., State v. Sanders, 174 S.E.2d 487, 492 (N.C. 1970) (“This Court has
consistently upheld the single-verdict procedure established by this statute.”), rev’d on
other grounds, 403 U.S. 948 (1971).
27. See id. at 493.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 492.
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constitutional law, or even as a matter of federal procedure.”30 Although
the defendant in Sanders was hopeful that the federal Supreme Court
would change that practice, the state court ruled otherwise: “we do not
think we should anticipate that that Court will declare unconstitutional
a practice approved in many states, including our own, for so many
years.”31
By statute, however, a criminal trial must now be bifurcated
whenever the State of North Carolina seeks the death penalty.32 This
requirement for bifurcation was added to the state statutes in 1977.33
Since that time, a jury must first determine whether a defendant in a
death penalty case is guilty and then, if it so finds, determine whether
the defendant should receive a sentence of death or life in prison.34
Until the recent tort reform legislation, this law was the only one in the
State that explicitly encouraged bifurcation.35
In the separate sentencing hearing in capital cases, there is no
requirement to resubmit evidence from the guilt portion of the trial.36
By statute, all previous evidence is permissible for the jury to consider in
determining punishment.37 Furthermore, a court has permission to
receive any evidence deemed to have probative value.38 Thus, a
defendant is not entitled to a different jury in the sentencing
proceeding.39 Instead, the evidence received at the sentencing hearing is
cumulative and added upon the evidence previously received in the guilt
phase.40
Bifurcated criminal proceedings are not limited to cases of firstdegree murder, however. In any felony trial, a judge may decide that a
separate sentencing proceeding is necessary.41 Furthermore, the statute
on habitual felons requires a jury first to determine whether the
30. Id. at 492–93 (quoting Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 568 (1967)).
31. Id. at 493.
32. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000 (2013).
33. Act of May 19, 1977, No. 406, sec. 2, § 15A-2000(a), 1977 N.C. Sess. Laws 407,
407.
34. Id.
35. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000.
36. Id. § 15A-2000(a)(3).
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. See, e.g., State v. Taylor, 283 S.E.2d 761, 769 (N.C. 1981) (“Under Article 100 of
Chapter 15A of the General Statutes of North Carolina, it is intended that the same jury
should hear both phases of the trial unless the original jury is ‘unable to reconvene.’”).
40. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(a)(3).
41. Id. § 15A-1340.16(a1).
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defendant committed a felony and second to determine if he is a habitual
felon.42 In cases of impaired driving, a jury first determines whether the
statute has been violated, and the judge then determines the appropriate
sentence.43 Bifurcation between defendants may also be used to protect a
defendant from being prejudiced by the introduction of evidence that is
only relevant to a co-defendant.44 Bifurcated trials are permitted in other
situations as well, and the decision is generally within the trial court’s
discretion.45
The Supreme Court of North Carolina recently recognized a “longstanding principle that when a statute is silent on whether to bifurcate,
trial judges have the inherent authority and discretion to manage
proceedings before them.”46 Notably, the court did not cite to any
authority for this “long-standing principle.”47 In State v. Ward, the
defendant was convicted of several felonies, including first-degree
murder.48 After remand from the Supreme Court of North Carolina for a
new sentencing proceeding, the defendant sought to bifurcate the
determination of mental retardation from the capital sentencing
hearing.49 The trial court denied his motion, which the Supreme Court
of North Carolina affirmed.50 Because the statute neither required nor
prohibited bifurcation, the decision was within the trial court’s
discretion.51 Using the same rationale, the court had previously decided
that bifurcation was not required between proceedings to determine
insanity and proceedings to determine guilt.52
The Ward Court did note, however, that “[t]he evidence presented
to the jury on these questions may overlap somewhat.”53 At the same

42. Id. § 14-7.5.
43. Id. § 20-138.1(d); see also United States v. Kendrick, 636 F. Supp. 189, 190
(E.D.N.C. 1986) (describing the “bifurcated procedure”).
44. See, e.g., State v. Tirado, 599 S.E.2d 515, 537 (N.C. 2004) (noting that the trial
court bifurcated sentencing proceedings to admit a co-defendant’s statement without
prejudicing the other defendant).
45. See, e.g., State v. Lopez, 681 S.E.2d 271, 272 (N.C. 2009) (discussing a bifurcated
trial on charges of second-degree murder and assault with a deadly weapon).
46. State v. Ward, 694 S.E.2d 729, 730 (N.C. 2010).
47. See id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 730, 735.
51. Id. at 735.
52. State v. Huff, 381 S.E.2d 635, 678 (N.C. 1989); State v. Helms, 201 S.E.2d 850,
853 (N.C. 1974).
53. Ward, 694 S.E.2d at 732.
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time, the court opined that the evidence would likely be significantly
different.54 Even though the statute permits a court to consider a wide
range of evidence,55 the ordinary rules of evidence generally apply in the
sentencing proceeding.56 The court did not discuss further the
evidentiary issues associated with bifurcation.
The purposes of bifurcation in the criminal context have not been
always been clear. Apparently, the bifurcated approach is for the
defendant’s benefit.57 According to the Supreme Court of North
Carolina, because “the determination of guilt is entirely divorced from
the imposition of punishment,” “the nature of the bifurcated trial itself
serves to prevent the issue of probable punishment from bleeding over
into the determination of guilt or innocence.”58 Alternatively, it has been
stated that “[t]he purpose of bifurcating the trial is to avoid prejudice to
the defendant and confusion of the jury during the proceeding on the
principal offense.”59 Even defense attorneys may be confused about the
purpose of bifurcation, as one attorney remarked after being asked why a
capital proceeding is bifurcated, “God only knows.”60
In a bifurcation setting, the two proceedings are intended to be
distinct and separate.61 However, an allusion to the second proceeding
during the first proceeding is not strictly prohibited. In State v. Gibbs,
for example, the prosecutor made comments during voir dire alluding to
the penalty phase that, the defendant argued, implied the penalty phase
would be reached.62 Rather than finding the comments prejudicial, the
Supreme Court of North Carolina found that the prosecutor’s comments
“simply refer[red] to the conditional nature of bifurcated capital
prosecutions.”63 Similarly, prosecutors are permitted to ask potential
jurors about their views on the death penalty.64 The Supreme Court of

54. Id.
55. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(a)(3) (2013).
56. State v. Cherry, 257 S.E.2d 551, 559 (N.C. 1979) (“The language of this statute
does not alter the usual rules of evidence or impair the trial judge’s power to rule on the
[a]dmissibility of evidence.”).
57. See State v. Barfield, 259 S.E.2d 510, 541–42 (N.C. 1979).
58. Id.
59. State v. Holmes, No. COA08-646, 2009 N.C. App. LEXIS 218, at *5 (N.C. Ct.
App. Mar. 3, 2009).
60. Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 707 (2002) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
61. See State v. Gibbs, 436 S.E.2d 321, 342–43 (N.C. 1993).
62. Id.
63. Id. at 342; see also State v. Prevatte, 570 S.E.2d 440, 467–68 (N.C. 2002) (relying
on Gibbs).
64. See State v. Hinson, 311 S.E.2d 256, 260–61 (N.C. 1984).
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North Carolina has repeatedly rejected the argument that a bifurcated
trial in death penalty cases results in a jury that is improperly inclined to
find guilt.65 Thus, a trial court’s preliminary comments on the nature of
a bifurcated trial does not “precipitate[] a rush to judgment by the
jury.”66
Absent a statutory mandate, a defendant is not entitled to
bifurcation of the sentencing proceeding.67 The decision to bifurcate any
issue, crime, or defendant is left to the trial court’s discretion.68 Except
in very narrow circumstances, North Carolina has left that decision to
the trial judges who are closest to the proceedings.
North Carolina is, of course, not the only state to bifurcate
proceedings in criminal trials.69 The Supreme Court blessed, and
actually encouraged, bifurcated proceedings to satisfy the constitutional
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.70 In theory, the two
proceedings are treated as “separate universes, governed by very different
rules.”71 But some continue to question the viability of a bifurcated
system in which the same jury determines both the conviction and the
sentencing.72
For purposes of this Article, four points are important to remember
from the criminal context. First, bifurcation makes voir dire trickier.
Second, a defendant is ordinarily not entitled to bifurcation. Third, a
strict division between the proceedings is not always maintained.

65. Id.
66. State v. Price, 272 S.E.2d 103, 115 (N.C. 1980).
67. See, e.g., State v. Lopez, 681 S.E.2d 271, 272 (N.C. 2009) (discussing a bifurcated
trial on charges of second-degree murder and assault with a deadly weapon); see also
State v. Tirado, 599 S.E.2d 515, 537 (N.C. 2004) (noting that the trial court bifurcated
sentencing proceedings to admit a co-defendant’s statement without prejudicing the
other defendant).
68. Wallace v. Evans, 298 S.E.2d 193, 196 (N.C. Ct. App. 1982) (“Whether . . . there
should be severance rests in the sound discretion of the trial judge.”).
69. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 921.141 (2011) (prescribing bifurcation in cases of capital
felonies).
70. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 195 (1976) (explaining that constitutional
concerns “are best met by a system that provides for a bifurcated proceeding at which the
sentencing authority is apprised of the information relevant to the imposition of sentence
and provided with standards to guide its use of the information”).
71. John G. Douglass, Confronting Death: Sixth Amendment Rights at Capital
Sentencing, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1967, 1968 (2005).
72. See, e.g., id. at 1972 (arguing that the Sixth Amendment should apply with equal
force to both phases of the trial); Susan D. Rozelle, The Principled Executioner: Capital
Juries’ Bias and the Benefits of True Bifurcation, 38 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 769, 771–72 (2006)
(arguing that a different jury should hear the sentencing phase).

Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 2014

9

1._NELSON_FINAL_4.8.14_-_NEED_TO_PDF

4/9/2014 10:32 AM

Campbell Law Review, Vol. 36, Iss. 2 [2014], Art. 1

210

CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 36:201

Fourth, the value of bifurcation is still unclear. All four of those points
have salient applicability in the civil arena as well.
C. Bifurcation in North Carolina Civil Cases
Bifurcation is not limited to the criminal context; it also applies in
civil litigation. Given the trial judge’s broad authority to separate issues
or claims,73 bifurcation is permissible in many different facets. For
example, since 1995 North Carolina has permitted a defendant to seek
bifurcation of compensatory damages from a determination regarding
punitive damages.74 Under statute, “[e]vidence relating solely to
punitive damages shall not be admissible until the trier of fact has
determined that the defendant is liable for compensatory damages and
has determined the amount of compensatory damages.”75 What was
once considered a negative76 is now mandated by statute.
Bifurcation is also permitted without specific statutory authority,
and a few examples will suffice to demonstrate the breadth of the
resultant possibilities. In Lewis v. Purcell, the trial court granted the
defendants’ motion to bifurcate proceedings to determine a disputed
property line and then, if necessary, to adjudicate separately the
plaintiffs’ claims for unlawful timber cutting.77 Because the plaintiffs
failed to establish the property line as alleged, there was no need to
address the second proceeding or its attendant evidentiary questions.78
In McArtan v. Barnum, the trial court bifurcated the case first to
determine whether a partnership existed and second to determine the
claims and damages.79 In Daugherty v. Cherry Hospital, the case was
bifurcated to determine, as a threshold matter, whether the plaintiff’s
claims were time barred.80 In another case, the trial court granted a
motion to bifurcate a case between claims of negligence and breach of
73. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1A-1, Rule 42(b) (2013).
74. Id. § 1D-30.
75. Id.; see also Rhyne v. K-Mart Corp., 594 S.E.2d 1, 6 (N.C. 2004) (analyzing the
punitive damages statute after bifurcated proceedings in the trial court).
76. See Tridyn Indus., Inc. v. Am. Mut. Ins. Co., 251 S.E.2d 443, 448 (N.C. 1979)
(explaining previous rulings on appealability because “[n]ot to have permitted an
immediate appeal might have resulted in a bifurcated trial in which one proceeding
would have been directed toward compensatory and another toward punitive damages”).
77. Lewis v. Purcell, No. COA09-670, 2010 N.C. App. LEXIS 963, at *2 (N.C. Ct.
App. June 15, 2010).
78. See id. at *10–11.
79. McArtan v. Barnum, No. COA02-1352, 2003 N.C. App. LEXIS 1251, at *2 (N.C.
Ct. App. July 1, 2003).
80. Daugherty v. Cherry Hospital, 670 S.E.2d 915, 918 (N.C. Ct. App. 2009).
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contract on the one hand and a contractual provision that purportedly
limited damages on the other.81 In Vernon v. Cuomo, the North Carolina
Business Court bifurcated the trial to first determine liability and then to
determine the value of the disputed shares.82 More recently, the Court
of Appeals of North Carolina affirmed a trial court’s decision to separate
a plaintiff’s product liability claims from a claim for unfair or deceptive
trade practices.83
Bifurcation may also result from an agreement between the parties.
The parties in Kraft v. Town of Mt. Olive, a quiet title action, agreed to a
bifurcated trial to determine first whether the plaintiff was entitled to
quiet title and second whether the defendant-town had acquired a
prescriptive easement over the property.84 In another case, the parties
agreed to bifurcate the proceedings to determine the enforceability of a
covenant not to compete first, and then to determine separately the
issues of breach and damages.85 Of course, such an agreement still
requires the trial court’s blessing.
Additionally, courts have encouraged bifurcation in other settings.
In a legal malpractice case, it was proper for the trial court to bifurcate
the proceedings to determine whether the plaintiff had a valid claim
against the purported tortfeasor before determining whether the
attorneys were negligent.86 In such situations, in which the plaintiff
must prove “a case within a case,” the Court of Appeals of North
Carolina found that “the trying of both cases at once would likely have
prejudiced the present defendants in defending themselves.”87
Furthermore, that court has held that where an insurance carrier is
defending a case as an unnamed defendant, trial of the coverage issues
should be bifurcated.88 In all of these cases, the parties either agreed to
the bifurcation or the trial court, exercising its discretion, found that
bifurcation would be beneficial and expeditious.

81. Blaylock Grading Co. v. Smith, 658 S.E.2d 680, 681–82 (N.C. Ct. App. 2008).
82. Vernon v. Cuomo, No. 06CVS8416, 2010 NCBC LEXIS 7, at *3 (N.C. Super. Ct.
Mar. 15, 2010).
83. Muteff v. Invacare Corp., 721 S.E.2d 379, 381–82 (N.C. Ct. App. 2012).
84. Kraft v. Town of Mt. Olive, 645 S.E.2d 132, 134 (N.C. Ct. App. 2007).
85. Hartman v. W.H. Odell & Assocs., Inc., 450 S.E.2d 912, 914 (N.C. Ct. App.
1994).
86. Kearns v. Horsley, 552 S.E.2d 1, 3 (N.C. Ct. App. 2001).
87. Id. at 7.
88. Church v. Allstate Ins. Co., 547 S.E.2d 458, 462 (N.C. Ct. App. 2001).
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A judge has had, until recently, the authority to bifurcate
proceedings sua sponte.89 In Marshall v. Williams, although the plaintiffs
objected to the bifurcation, the Court of Appeals of North Carolina
upheld the trial court’s decision to bifurcate without a motion from a
party.90 Furthermore, the defendants stipulated that the plaintiff’s injury
was a direct result of the accident, so the plaintiffs were not denied any
opportunity to present evidence on an essential element of their claim.91
Under the compensatory-punitive damages bifurcation, however, a
motion is required.92 Without a motion, evidence regarding the second
issue (which would otherwise be separated) is admissible at any time
during the plaintiff’s case-in-chief.93 Under the new law, a motion is also
required to bifurcate the liability and damages issues.94
The Supreme Court of North Carolina also approved a bifurcated
trial in In re Will of Hester.95 Hester concerned three purported wills of a
testator.96 After the propounders submitted the last of the three wills for
probate, a jury determined that the testator lacked sufficient mental
capacity to execute that will.97 In a subsequent proceeding, the jury
determined that the second of the three wills was valid.98 The Supreme
Court of North Carolina approved of the bifurcated approach, as the
decision was within the trial court’s discretion.99 The question to ask is
“whether separation of the issues furthers convenience and avoids
prejudice.”100 According to the court, “[b]ifurcation was the most
reasonable and sensible approach under the circumstances.”101

89. See, e.g., Jay Grp., Ltd. v. Glasgow, 534 S.E.2d 233, 234 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000)
(explaining that “[t]he trial court, ex mero motu, ordered that the issues of liability and
damages be bifurcated into separate trials before the same jury”).
90. Marshall v. Williams, 574 S.E.2d 1, 4 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002).
91. Id.
92. Ward v. Beaton, 539 S.E.2d 30, 36 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000) (“[T]he defendant is not
entitled to bifurcation until the defendant files such a motion.”).
93. Id.
94. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1A-1, Rule 42(b) (2013).
95. In re Will of Hester, 360 S.E.2d 801, 802 (N.C. 1987).
96. Id.
97. Id. at 803.
98. Id. at 803–04.
99. Id. at 804.
100. Id. at 804–05.
101. Id. at 805; see also Kirkman v. Wilson, 390 S.E.2d 698, 700 (N.C. Ct. App. 1990)
(noting that the trial court “ordered a bifurcated trial because there were numerous
issues in controversy”), vacated by 401 S.E.2d 359 (N.C. 1991).
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Bifurcation is also applicable to cases involving termination of
parental rights. Those cases involve a two-part process: an adjudicatory
phase and a dispositional phase.102 The first phase asks whether there is
an adequate basis to terminate parental rights, and the second phase
determines whether termination is in the best interest of the child.103
However, “so long as the court applies the different evidentiary standards
at each of the two stages, there is no requirement that the stages be
conducted at two separate hearings.”104
The different evidentiary standards in those two phases may be easy
to state but difficult to apply. Therefore, the Court of Appeals of North
Carolina has established a presumption that a judge is adequately
equipped to determine whether grounds for termination exist before
proceeding to consider evidence regarding the best interest of the
child.105 The empirical question of whether this presumption has a basis
in fact has not been answered. Claims from parents alleging that
improper evidence was received during the first proceeding are cursorily
dismissed.106 Thus, North Carolina relies on its trial court judges to
separate evidence between the two phases, regardless of the difficulty in
a particular case.
But North Carolina’s new law affects bifurcation in a more limited
sense of separating the issue of liability from the issue of damages.
Thus, this Article is chiefly concerned with bifurcation between
proceedings involving the same parties. Trials may be divided in other
situations, such as severing claims or severing some of the parties.107
Although there are related evidentiary issues in those situations, the
scope of this new law is limited to bifurcation in the sense of two
102. In re P.C.H., No. COA10-148, 2010 N.C. App. LEXIS 1127, at *5 (N.C. Ct. App.
July 6, 2010).
103. Id. at *5–6.
104. In re Shepard, 591 S.E.2d 1, 6 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004).
105. In re White, 344 S.E.2d 36, 38 (N.C. Ct. App. 1986).
106. See, e.g., In re Z.H., No. COA09-1570, 2010 N.C. App. LEXIS 655, at *12–13
(N.C. Ct. App. Apr. 20, 2010) (rejecting a father’s claim that the trial court “heard almost
exclusively best interest evidence” during the initial adjudication phase); In re J.N., No.
COA09-1239, 2010 N.C. App. LEXIS 417, at *5–7 (N.C. Ct. App. Mar. 2, 2010)
(rejecting a mother’s claim that the trial court improperly considered her child’s
demeanor during initial adjudication phase).
107. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1A-1, Rule 42(b)(1) (2013) (allowing for separate
trials “in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice”); Hoke Cnty. Bd. of Educ. v.
State, 599 S.E.2d 365, 375 (N.C. 2004) (accepting the trial court’s bifurcation of trials
between “rural school district plaintiffs” and “large urban school district plaintiffintervenors”); Braddy v. Nationwide Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 470 S.E.2d 820, 822 (N.C. Ct.
App. 1996) (discussing the trial court’s decision to bifurcate some claims).
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different proceedings involving identical parties.108 In other words, this
statutory provision concerns the decision “to sever issues within a single
trial or proceeding for separate submission to the same jury.”109
Before this law was passed, courts still had the authority to bifurcate
the liability and damages portions of a trial. In Blackwood v. Cates, for
example, the parties agreed to bifurcate the trial to determine liability
first and then to determine damages.110 In Rushing v. Aldridge, a referee
bifurcated the damages issues in an adverse possession trial.111 Again,
the decision was left to the trial court’s discretion.112 Even before the
passage of the law, courts have had “broad discretionary authority to
determine when bifurcation is appropriate.”113 Thus, courts would
occasionally bifurcate the liability and damages issues.114 The difference
was that the decision was based upon an examination of the specific
facts and circumstances rather than a statutory mandate. Similarly,
courts have long had the authority to grant summary judgment on the
issue of liability even if there is a genuine issue of material fact as to the
amount of damages.115
In Land v. Land, the trial court granted the defendants’ motion to
bifurcate the liability and damages portions of the trial.116 A jury found
against the defendants on the liability issues, and the defendants then
sought to appeal.117 The Court of Appeals of North Carolina dismissed
the appeal as interlocutory.118 However, the court also ruled that “[t]he
issues decided at the first trial are thus separate and distinct from those
to be decided at the second trial, and there is no possibility of a second
jury rendering a verdict inconsistent with the verdict of the first jury.”119
The court seemed to assume that the issues were completely separate

108. Act of July 25, 2011, No. 400, sec. 2, § 1A-1, Rule 42(b), 2011 N.C. Sess. Laws
1712, 1713.
109. In re Will of Hester, 360 S.E.2d 801, 804 (N.C. 1987).
110. Blackwood v. Cates, 254 S.E.2d 7, 8 (N.C. 1979).
111. Rushing v. Aldridge, 713 S.E.2d 566, 570 (N.C. Ct. App. 2011).
112. Id. at 570, 576.
113. Roberts v. Young, 464 S.E.2d 78, 82 (N.C. Ct. App. 1995).
114. See, e.g., Ruff v. Parex, Inc., No. 96 CVS 0059, 1999 NCBC LEXIS 6, at *2, 6
(N.C. Super. Ct. June 17, 1999).
115. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1A-1, Rule 56(c) (2013) (“A summary judgment, interlocutory
in character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is genuine
issue as to the amount of damages.”).
116. Land v. Land, 687 S.E.2d 511, 514 (N.C. Ct. App. 2010).
117. Id.
118. Id. at 518.
119. Id. at 516 (emphasis added).
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and distinct, but it did not explain why. The court did “acknowledge
that there will, of necessity, be some repetition of evidence at the second
trial to orient the second jury as to the nature of plaintiffs’ claims for
compensatory and punitive damages,” but the court held that such
repetition “does not mean that the same issues will be decided at the
second trial.”120
Other cases have similarly shown that the evidence does indeed
overlap between the two proceedings. In Hester, for example, even
though the first proceeding only determined the validity of the last of
three wills, all three of the purported wills were received into
evidence.121 Similarly, evidence of liability and compensatory damages
may often be the same evidence as that presented for punitive damages.
Although “‘evidence relating solely to punitive damages shall not be
admissible’ in the compensatory damages portion of the trial,” plaintiffs
may introduce “the totality of their evidence during the compensatory
damages portion of the trial to establish liability.”122
Furthermore, some courts have recognized that the two
proceedings are not really that “separate and distinct.”123 Thus, a court
on remand cannot re-try a punitive damages issue without also re-trying
the liability and compensatory damages issues.124 Instead, a court on
remand must “start over at the beginning” to examine the liability issues
before reaching the issue of punitive damages.125 The purpose of such a
rule is so that the same jury can try all of the relevant issues.126
Conversely, when a case is bifurcated between liability and damages, a
court may permissibly re-try only the damages issue if it is “separate and
distinct from the other issues and the new trial can be had without
danger of complication with other matters in the case.”127

120. Id.
121. In re Will of Hester, 360 S.E.2d 801, 803 (N.C. 1987).
122. Gibbs v. Mayo, 591 S.E.2d 905, 911 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004) (emphasis in original)
(quoting N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1D-30 (2003)).
123. See generally Fortune v. First Union Nat’l Bank, 371 S.E.2d 483, 486 (N.C. 1988)
(discussing the standard for when a trial may be bifurcated).
124. See Jones v. Harrelson & Smith Contractors, LLC, 670 S.E.2d 242, 252 (N.C. Ct.
App. 2008), aff’d, 677 S.E.2d 453 (N.C. 2009).
125. Id.
126. Lindsey v. Boddie-Noell Enters., Inc., 555 S.E.2d 369, 377 (N.C. Ct. App. 2001),
rev’d per curiam on other grounds, 562 S.E.2d 420 (N.C. 2002).
127. City of Charlotte v. Skidmore, Owings & Merrill, 407 S.E.2d 571, 582 (N.C. Ct.
App. 1991) (quoting Fortune, 371 S.E.2d at 486).
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Because the decision to bifurcate is solely within the trial court’s
discretion, it is reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard.128 But
that is not to say that North Carolina has a general policy favoring
bifurcation.129 While the decision to bifurcate the issues of liability and
damages is ostensibly in the trial court’s discretion, appellate courts are
not keen on bifurcating without substantial justification.130 In Headley v.
Williams, the Court of Appeals of North Carolina said that “[t]he
decision to bifurcate a trial in furtherance of convenience or to avoid
prejudice is left to the discretion of the trial court,” but it also directed
the lower court that, on remand, “a single trial of the negligence and
damages issues is recommended.”131 In other words, the decision is up
to the trial court, but it had better be the right decision.132
Moreover, litigants’ attempts to blur the line between the two
proceedings are often rebutted. For example, North Carolina’s statutes
on cartways generally “contemplate a bifurcated procedure[,]” in which
the first question is whether the petitioner has a right to a cartway and
the second question is where the cartway should be located.133 When a
party argued that a petitioner had failed to identify the proper location
for the cartway in the first phase of the proceeding, the Court of Appeals
of North Carolina quipped that the party had put “the cart before the
horse.”134 Because of the bifurcated nature of the proceedings, such an
argument was meritless because that issue was explicitly confined to the
second phase of the proceeding.135
In the civil context, the justifications for bifurcation may be a little
different than in the criminal context. According to the Eastern District
of North Carolina, “simplification of discovery is the ‘major benefit’ of
bifurcation.”136 On the other hand, one “favored purpose” of bifurcation
is “avoiding a difficult question by first dealing with an easier, dispositive

128. Land v. Land, 687 S.E.2d 511, 517 (N.C. Ct. App. 2010).
129. See, e.g., Headley v. Williams, 590 S.E.2d 443, 448 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004)
(suggesting to trial judges that a single trial is recommended in most cases).
130. See id.
131. Id. (quoting Wallace v. Evans, 298 S.E.2d 193, 196 (N.C. Ct. App. 1982)).
132. See Vance Trucking Co. v. Phillips, 311 S.E.2d 318, 321 (N.C. Ct. App. 1984)
(recommending that the trial court “enter findings and conclusions that will establish the
appropriateness of severance” because, in the appellate court’s opinion, a single trial
“would not present a suit of unmanageable size”).
133. Jones v. Robbins, 660 S.E.2d 118, 120 (N.C. Ct. App. 2008).
134. Id. at 121.
135. See id.
136. Novopharm Ltd. v. Torpharm, Inc., 181 F.R.D. 308, 312 (E.D.N.C. 1998)
(quoting Industrias Metalicas Marva, Inc. v. Lausell, 172 F.R.D. 1, 4 (D.P.R. 1997)).
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issue.”137 Another court declared that “the purpose” of bifurcation is
“conservation of judicial resources and simplification of issues.”138 Or,
more generally perhaps, bifurcation “is primarily a device that safeguards
the defendant’s rights.”139
D. North Carolina’s New Law on Bifurcation
Trial courts’ discretionary authority was significantly changed by a
portion of North Carolina’s Tort Reform Act140 that has heretofore
received little attention. The Act added a new portion to North
Carolina’s Rules of Civil Procedure, which are codified in the General
Statutes.141 The new provision reads:
Upon motion of any party in an action in tort wherein the plaintiff seeks
damages exceeding one hundred fifty thousand dollars ($150,000), the
court shall order separate trials for the issue of liability and the issue of
damages, unless the court for good cause shown orders a single trial.
Evidence relating solely to compensatory damages shall not be
admissible until the trier of fact has determined that the defendant is
liable. The same trier of fact that tries the issues relating to liability shall
try the issues relating to damages.142

The entire Act itself had a tortured history, as it was a piece of
legislation cobbled together from previous attempts at tort reform.143
The 2011 version was sponsored by three state senators: Tom Apodaca,
Harry Brown, and Bob Rucho.144 The bill was ratified by both houses of
the General Assembly only to be vetoed by Governor Beverly Perdue in
June 2011.145 Governor Perdue maintained that she was “committed to
passing meaningful medical malpractice reform” but that the version of
the bill presented to her was “unbalanced.”146 The next month, however,

137. Danjaq LLC v. Sony Corp., 263 F.3d 942, 961 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Hirst v.
Gertzen, 676 F.2d 1252, 1261 (9th Cir. 1982)).
138. Concept Design Elecs. & Mfg., Inc. v. Duplitronics, Inc., No. 94-1264, 1995 U.S.
App. LEXIS 848, at *7–8 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 17, 1995).
139. United States v. Sarbello, 985 F.2d 716, 726 (3d Cir. 1993).
140. Act of July 25, 2011, No. 400, 2011 N.C. Sess. Laws 1712.
141. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1A-1 (2013).
142. Id. § 1A-1, Rule 42(b)(3).
143. See, e.g., S.B. 979, 2009–10 Gen. Assemb. (N.C. 2009) (proposing provisions
similar to those of the Act that was enacted).
144. See S.B. 33, 2011–12 Gen. Assemb. (N.C. 2011).
145. See Beverly Eaves Perdue, Governor’s Objections and Veto Message (June 24,
2011), http://www.ncleg.net/Sessions/2011/s33Veto/letter.pdf.
146. Id.
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the legislature overrode the veto, and the law went into effect on
October 1, 2011.147
Because of other provisions in the Tort Reform Act, including a cap
on noneconomic damages,148 the bifurcation provision received little
attention in the media or in the General Assembly.149 One state
representative introduced an amendment to the bill to delete the
provision on bifurcation, but the amendment was voted down.150 The
Senate’s version of the bill would have placed the bifurcation threshold
at seventy-five thousand dollars ($75,000) and would have removed all
judicial discretion by making bifurcation mandatory.151 Aside from these
proposed changes, however, the provision on bifurcation was largely
inconspicuous.
Most commentators assume that the provision was added to benefit
defendants, usually corporations and hospitals.152 According to the
North Carolina Medical Society, such a bifurcated approach “[a]ddresses
the classic jury error of confusing bad outcomes with medical
negligence.”153 The theory behind the provision is that separating the
issue of damages from the issue of liability will lead to more just results
because jurors determining liability will not be swayed by sympathy for
the plaintiff’s damages.154 The politically correct reason for the provision
is that “everybody is more fairly treated that way.”155
147. Act of July 25, 2011, No. 400, sec. 11, 2011 N.C. Sess. Laws 1712, 1717.
148. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.19(a) (2013). Under the new law, noneconomic
damages in medical malpractice cases are generally limited to five hundred thousand
dollars ($500,000). See id.
149. See, e.g., Rob Christensen, Ex Chief Justices Battle Over Medical Malpractice, NEWS
& OBSERVER (Feb. 15, 2011, 1:18 PM), http://projects.newsobserver.com/under_the_
dome/ex_chief_justices_battle_over_medical_malpractice (focusing on the cap on
noneconomic damages).
150. See Sylvia Adcock, Lawmakers Tackle Comp, Continue Debate on Tort Reform,
N.C. LAW. WKLY. (Apr. 8, 2011), http://nclawyersweekly.com/2011/04/08/lawmakerstackle-comp-continue-debate-on-tort-reform/.
151. See Comparison of Senate and House Versions of SB33, NORTH CAROLINA MEDICAL
SOCIETY, 1, http://www.ncmedsoc.org/blog/wp-content/uploads/2011/04/Senate-v-HouseTort-Bills2.pdf (last visited Jan. 9, 2014).
152. See generally F. Marshall Wall & Dexter M. Campbell III, Bifurcation of Civil
Trials in Trucking Cases, FOR THE DEFENSE, Feb. 2010, at 29, 29, available at
http://www.cshlaw.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/FTD-1002-WallCampbell.pdf
(discussing the benefits of bifurcation for defendants in major personal injury lawsuits).
153. Medical Liability Reforms, NORTH CAROLINA MEDICAL SOCIETY http://www.
ncmedsoc.org/government_affairs/sb_33.html (last visited Jan. 12, 2014).
154. See id.
155. Lis v. Robert Packer Hosp., 579 F.2d 819, 823 (3d Cir. 1978) (quoting the trial
court’s rationale for bifurcation in a negligence case).
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The language of the bifurcation provision is apparently based on the
similar provision regarding bifurcation of compensatory and punitive
damages, which was passed in 1995.156 This previous law has gained
traction among other jurisdictions. Some states have passed similar laws
to the bifurcation provision on punitive damages,157 while other states
have proposed bills patterning the North Carolina statute.158 Still other
states have passed laws with different procedural aspects but similar
policy justifications.159
Under the current statutes, then, a future trial in North Carolina has
the very distinct possibility of being trifurcated. A jury would first
determine whether the defendant is liable, then determine the amount of
compensatory damages, and then determine the amount of punitive
damages. Given the percentage of cases that actually proceed to trial, it
is far from clear that such a tripartite approach would actually serve the
interests of judicial economy or benefit the parties as alleged. Regardless
of its effects, however, the new law is a significant change in civil
procedure based on North Carolina’s limited history of bifurcation.
III. BIFURCATION IN FEDERAL COURTS
In federal court, the standard for bifurcation is a little more
stringent. Although federal courts have broad discretion to decide

156. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1D-30 (2013). That provision reads:
Upon the motion of a defendant, the issues of liability for compensatory
damages and the amount of compensatory damages, if any, shall be tried
separately from the issues of liability for punitive damages and the amount of
punitive damages, if any. Evidence relating solely to punitive damages shall
not be admissible until the trier of fact has determined that the defendant is
liable for compensatory damages and has determined the amount of
compensatory damages. The same trier of fact that tried the issues relating to
compensatory damages shall try the issues relating to punitive damages.
Id.
157. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2315.21 (LexisNexis 2011) (bifurcating the trial
into two phases, one to determine compensatory damages and another to determine
punitive damages).
158. See, e.g., S.B. 926, 2005 Leg., 116th Sess. (S.C. 2005) (proposing a provision with
virtually identical language to North Carolina’s statute).
159. See, e.g., S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 21-1-4.1 (2011) (“In any claim alleging punitive
or exemplary damages, before any discovery relating thereto may be commenced and
before any such claim may be submitted to the finder of fact, the court shall find, after a
hearing and based upon clear and convincing evidence, that there is a reasonable basis to
believe that there has been willful, wanton or malicious conduct on the part of the party
claimed against.”).
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whether bifurcation is appropriate,160 a moving party has the burden of
The standards for
showing that such bifurcation is merited.161
bifurcation in federal court are generally consistent across the country,162
but the federal courts in North Carolina serve as a good comparison to
the state court decisions described above.
In Scarbro v. New Hanover County, an individual defendant sought
to bifurcate the liability and damages issues to obtain an early
determination on his defense of qualified immunity.163 The trial court
denied the motion, reasoning that “once it is clear that such early
resolution is impossible, trial is necessary, and it is assumed that ‘a single
trial will be more expedient’ than separate trials.”164 The court accepted
the defendant’s argument that “most or even all of the evidence” related
to damages would be “separate and distinguishable from evidence related
to liability.”165 But because there would be some overlap in the evidence,
the court ruled that bifurcation was not appropriate.166 The defendant’s
claims of prejudice were similarly outweighed by “the prejudice that
would accrue from ‘depriving plaintiff of her legitimate right to place
before the jury the circumstances and atmosphere of the entire cause of
action . . . replacing it with a sterile or laboratory atmosphere in which
causation is parted from the reality of the injury[.]’”167
The defendant made a similar motion in Snoznik v. Jeld-Wen, Inc.168
Snoznik involved a products liability action against a window
manufacturer in which the defendant sought to bifurcate the liability and
160. Scarbro v. New Hanover Cnty., No. 7:03-CV-244-FL, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
69886, at *6 (E.D.N.C. June 27, 2011) (citing Dixon v. CSX Transp., Inc., 990 F.2d
1440, 1443 (4th Cir. 1993)).
161. Id. at *7 (citing F&G Scrolling Mouse, L.L.C. v. IBM Corp., 190 F.R.D. 385, 387
(M.D.N.C. 1999) (asserting incorrectly that F & G Scrolling Mouse was decided by the
District of Maryland)).
162. But see Kathleen Burdette Shields & Jessica Gan Lee, The Bifurcation Divide, LAW
360 (Nov. 18, 2009), http://www.choate.com/uploads/113/doc/Shields,%20Lee%20%20Law360%20-%20The%20Bifurcation%20Divide.pdf (noting that “[c]ourts around
the country have very different views as to the advisability of bifurcation in patent
cases”).
163. Scarbro, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 69866, at *5.
164. Id. at *8 (quoting F&G Scrolling Mouse, 190 F.R.D. at 387 (citing incorrectly the
court as the District of Maryland)).
165. Id. at *12.
166. See id.
167. Id. at *13 (quoting In re Beverly Hills Fire Lit., 695 F.2d 207, 217 (6th Cir. 1982)
(internal alterations omitted)).
168. Snoznik v. Jeld-Wen, Inc., No. 1:09cv42, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35308
(W.D.N.C. Apr. 1, 2009).
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damages issues.169 In support of its argument, the defendant cited a
study from Harvard University which allegedly demonstrated that even
juries that are instructed to separate evidence of liability from issues of
damages “fail to follow such instructions.”170 Rejecting such an
argument, the court deemed itself “well aware that the plaintiff’s and
defendant’s bar are well equipped to commission studies providing
fodder on any number of issues.”171 The court went on to explain that
“[t]he tradition under the seventh amendment has been, for the last 220
years, for the same jury to determine liability and damages. Such a
tradition—nay a right—should not be so quickly abandoned . . . .”172
The court further quoted a fellow federal district court:
[D]efendants maintain that bifurcation will serve the interests of
expedition and economy. The Court fails to see how this can be so. For
example, two trials would require the Court to conduct similar voir dire
examinations twice. Twice as many citizens would be required to take
the time to travel to the Court to participate in jury selection. Standard
preliminary and final jury instructions would also be given in both trials.
More[o]ver, as plaintiff points out, some witnesses may have to testify at
both trials. The Court finds that the interests of expedition and
economy would be served best by a single trial.173

In essence, the court concluded it could not find that bifurcation would
lead to greater convenience or expediency for anyone involved.174
In F&G Scrolling Mouse, LLC v. IBM Corp., the defendant moved
under Rule 42 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to bifurcate a
patent infringement case into separate liability and damages phases.175
In rejecting that motion, the trial court explained:
Notwithstanding the broad discretion conferred by Rule 42(b), the
bifurcation of issues and the separate trial of them is not the usual course
of events. Nothing else appearing, a single trial will be more expedient

169. See id. at *1.
170. Id. at *3.
171. Id.
172. Id. at *3–4.
173. Id. at *6–7 (quoting Lokai v. Mac Tools, Inc., No. 2:05-cv-00925, 2007 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 40765, at *17–18 (S.D. Ohio June 5, 2007)).
174. See id. at *6–8; see also Layman v. Alexander, 343 F. Supp. 2d 483, 495
(W.D.N.C. 2004) (denying the defendants’ motion to bifurcate the trial into liability and
damages phases because “one trial will serve the convenience of the parties and the
Court, will not prejudice either the Plaintiff or the Defendants, and will minimize
expenses and delays to each party”).
175. F & G Scrolling Mouse, L.L.C. v. IBM Corp., 190 F.R.D. 385, 386 (M.D.N.C.
1999).
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and efficient. The party requesting separate trials bears the burden of
convincing the court that such an exercise of its discretion will (1)
promote greater convenience to the parties, witnesses, jurors, and the
court, (2) be conducive to expedition and economy, and (3) not result in
undue prejudice to any party. Merely presenting some proof which
supports bifurcation is not enough. . . . The benefit of bifurcation must
outweigh the disadvantages.176

The court went on to find that “[e]ven if the issues are separable for
purposes of the Seventh Amendment, a court will likely decline to
bifurcate if there will be a significant overlap of evidence at the two trials
which would make separation inefficient and inexpedient.”177 The court
ultimately concluded that the defendant had not met its burden of
showing that bifurcation was justified.178
Indeed, federal courts seem to take this burden seriously. When
evidence is intertwined, courts will deny a motion to bifurcate.179
Similarly, a federal court denied a defendant’s motion to bifurcate the
issue of punitive damages when the court was “unconvinced the
Defendant would be prejudiced by not bifurcating these proceedings or
that bifurcation would expedite the trial or facilitate judicial
economy.”180 Even in the criminal context, courts are reluctant to
bifurcate issues that could be tried together.181 Indeed, one district court
found that the decision to bifurcate the proceedings is “one used as a last
resort.”182

176. Id. at 387 (citations omitted).
177. Id. at 388.
178. Id. at 395; see also Belmont Textile Mach. Co. v. Superba, S.A., 48 F. Supp. 2d
521, 526 (W.D.N.C. 1999) (finding that defendant failed to meet its burden to justify
bifurcation).
179. See, e.g., United States v. Jaimes-Cruz, No. 7:08-CR-139-1, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
64900, at *6–8 (E.D.N.C. July 24, 2009) (denying a defendant’s request to bifurcate
drug-related charges from immigration-related charges); Wittenberg ex rel. J.W. v.
Winston-Salem/Forsyth Cnty. Bd. of Educ., No. 1:05CV00818, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
65257, at *7 (M.D.N.C. Sept. 4, 2007) (denying a motion to bifurcate challenges to two
different Individualized Education Programs because “[t]he factual and legal issues in the
two claims are nearly identical”).
180. EEOC v. Winning Team, Inc., No. 1:07CV310, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92904, at
*2 (W.D.N.C. Oct. 30, 2008).
181. See, e.g., United States v. Corbett, No. 3:07cr144, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92106,
at *5 (W.D.N.C. Dec. 5, 2007) (denying a defendant’s motion to bifurcate “because the
prejudicial effect of introducing a defendant’s past conviction can be avoided through the
use of a limiting instruction” (citing United States v. Silva, 745 F.2d 840, 844 (4th Cir.
1984))).
182. Ring v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 159 F.R.D. 653, 657–58 (M.D.N.C. 1995).
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For example, in Technimark, Inc. v. Crellin, Inc., the court provided
three reasons for denying the defendant’s motion to bifurcate liability
from damages.183 First, proof of damages would not be particularly
complex.184 Second, the court found a potential overlap in the evidence
of the two issues, which would only add to the expense of litigation if
the two issues were tried separately.185 Third, arguments centered on
“judicial economy” were not enough to bifurcate the issues because
bifurcation would require a new jury for the second issue, thereby
increasing the burden on the judiciary.186 Furthermore, if the court were
to agree with the reasoning that bifurcation created judicial economy,
“there would be a strong argument supporting bifurcation in nearly
every civil trial.”187
That is not to say, however, that federal courts always refuse to
bifurcate proceedings. For example, one former district court judge for
the Middle District of North Carolina conducted a bench trial on the
issue of liability and ordered a separate proceeding to calculate
damages.188 Within the same district, a case of gender discrimination
was similarly bifurcated between damages and liability.189 Another
district court ordered bifurcation in a claim for unfair or deceptive trade
practices,190 as did a different district court in a case of union members’
claims against their union,191 yet none of these courts provided detailed
reasoning for the decision to bifurcate.

183. See Technimark, Inc. v. Crellin, Inc., No. 2:96CV00986, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
15933, at *3–6 (M.D.N.C. Aug. 4, 1997).
184. Id. at *3–4.
185. Id. at *4–5.
186. Id. at *5.
187. Id.
188. See Universal Furniture Int’l, Inc. v. Collezione Europa, USA, Inc., 599 F. Supp.
2d 648, 650 (M.D.N.C. 2009), aff’d, 618 F.3d 417 (4th Cir. 2010).
189. See Mercer v. Duke Univ., 301 F. Supp. 2d 454, 456 (M.D.N.C. 2004), aff’d, 401
F.3d 199 (4th Cir. 2005); see also Jordan v. Shaw Indus., Inc., No. 6:93CV542, 1996 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 17917, at *9–10 (M.D.N.C. Aug. 13, 1996) (noting bifurcation of a trial in
an age and gender discrimination case), aff’d, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 33589 (4th Cir. Nov.
26, 1997); Caldwell v. Seaboard Coastline R.R., No. C-C-75-133, 1976 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
15665, at *4–5 (W.D.N.C. June 28, 1977) (granting a motion for a bifurcated trial in a
racial employment discrimination class action lawsuit).
190. See Wake Stone Corp. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 995 F. Supp. 612, 613–14
(E.D.N.C. 1998).
191. Terry v. Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers, Local 391, 676 F. Supp. 659, 665
(M.D.N.C. 1987), aff’d, 863 F.2d 334 (4th Cir. 1988), aff’d, 494 U.S. 558 (1990).
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The courts that have provided reasoning have largely relied on the
complexity of the issues at hand.192 One district court bifurcated the
liability and damages issues in a patent infringement case “because of the
complex nature of the damages determination and the extensive
discovery that is often necessary to prove the nature and extent of those
damages.”193 As one judge explained, “[t]he most common justification
for separate trials is that the discovery and/or the trial of the issues of
liability and damages are sufficiently complex so that the two issues
should proceed separately.”194
Importantly, federal courts are not bound by state rules regarding
the propriety of bifurcation.195 In Rosales v. Honda Motor Co., the Fifth
Circuit upheld the district court’s decision to separate the liability and
damages issues even though the rules in Texas likely would have
precluded bifurcation.196 Similarly, the Sixth Circuit upheld bifurcation
in a diversity case even though the plaintiff alleged that he had a state

192. See, e.g., Static Control Components, Inc. v. Darkprint Imaging, Inc., 240 F.
Supp. 2d 465, 470 (M.D.N.C. 2002) (preferring bifurcation due to the “complexity of the
trade secret misappropriation issues”); Rhone-Poulenc Agro, S.A. v. Monsanto Co., No.
1:97CV1138, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21330, at *55 (M.D.N.C. Feb. 8, 2000) (noting that
“[t]he intent and logic of the bifurcation order was clear: in order to avoid the
complicated issues of patent law and to promote judicial economy”), aff’d sub nom.
Rhone-Poulenc Agro, S.A. v. DeKalb Genetics Corp., 271 F.3d 1081 (Fed. Cir. 2001),
vacated, 284 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2002), reaff’d, 345 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Textron
Inc. v. Barber-Colman Co., 903 F. Supp. 1570, 1582 (W.D.N.C. 1995) (noting that
actions under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act “are typically bifurcated by reason of their complexity”); White Chem. Corp. v.
Walsh Chem. Corp., 116 F.R.D. 580, 582 (W.D.N.C. 1987) (granting a motion to
bifurcate the trial because the case involved complex issues and the overlap of evidence
would be minimal); EEOC v. Olin Corp. United Paperworkers Int’l Union, Local No.
1971, No. A-C-78-186, 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9646, at *2 (W.D.N.C. Dec. 30, 1980)
(noting that bifurcation was ordered “in view of the size and complexity of the case”),
aff’d in part, vacated in part sub nom. Wright v. Olin Corp., 697 F.2d 1172 (4th Cir.
1982), vacated, 767 F.2d 915 (4th Cir. 1984).
193. Novopharm Ltd. v. Torpharm, Inc., 181 F.R.D. 308, 310 (E.D.N.C. 1998), aff’d
per curiam sub nom. TorPharm, Inc. v. Genpharm Inc., No. 99-1362, 2000 U.S. App.
LEXIS 11589 (Fed. Cir. May 17, 2000).
194. F & G Scrolling Mouse, L.L.C. v. IBM Corp., 190 F.R.D. 385, 388 (M.D.N.C.
1999) (citing Novopharm, 181 F.R.D. at 311).
195. See, e.g., Oulds v. Principal Mut. Life Ins. Co., 6 F.3d 1431, 1435 (10th Cir.
1993) (noting that “bifurcation of trials is permissible in federal court even when such
procedure is contrary to state law”).
196. See Rosales v. Honda Motor Co., 726 F.2d 259, 262 (5th Cir. 1984).
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“constitutional right to have all the issues of fact submitted to the same
jury at the same time.”197
As in the North Carolina state courts, federal courts may also
bifurcate under other circumstances. For example, a court may bifurcate
claims against private parties, which are heard before juries, from claims
against the United States, which can only be heard by the court.198 One
federal court granted a motion to bifurcate a declaratory judgment claim
regarding the existence of a partnership and a claim of unjust
enrichment from other claims of liability.199 Another court granted a
motion to bifurcate a trial “into non-secret and secret segments” to keep
the public from uncovering sensitive trade confidences.200
More generally, federal courts have held that “[b]ifurcation of
proceedings into separate trials concerning liability and damages is
appropriate when ‘the evidence pertinent to the two issues is wholly
unrelated’ and the evidence relevant to the damages issue could have a
prejudicial impact upon the jury’s liability determination.”201 In other
words, bifurcation is deemed acceptable in that it “furthers convenience
when the separable issues are substantially different.”202 This standard
seems to be in line with Supreme Court precedent on the propriety of
granting a partial new trial, which is permitted if it “clearly appears that
the issue to be retried is so distinct and separable from the others that a
trial of it alone may be had without injustice.”203

197. Moss v. Associated Transp., Inc., 344 F.2d 23, 26 (6th Cir. 1965) (citing
Harbison v. Briggs Bros. Paint Mfg. Co., 354 S.W.2d 464, 471 (Tenn. 1962), abandoned
by Ennix v. Clay, 703 S.W.2d 137, 139 (Tenn. 1986)).
198. See, e.g., Turner v. United States, 736 F. Supp. 2d 980, 987 (M.D.N.C. 2010).
199. See Walker v. White, No. 1:06-CV-350, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67157, at *2
(W.D.N.C. June 10, 2010).
200. Glaxo Inc. v. Novopharm Ltd., 931 F. Supp. 1280, 1299 (E.D.N.C. 1996), aff’d,
110 F.3d 1562 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
201. Helminski v. Ayerst Labs., 766 F.2d 208, 212 (6th Cir. 1985); see also 9A
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2390
(3d ed. 2013).
202. ADT Sec. Servs., Inc. v. Swenson, No. 07-2983, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107482, at
*21 (D. Minn. Sept. 21, 2011); see also Cardiac Sci., Inc. v. Koninklijke Philips Elecs.
N.V., No. 03-1064, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16881, at *4–5 (D. Minn. Sept. 20, 2003)
(noting how the jury could benefit from separation of issues involving a complex patent
dispute); 8 MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE–CIVIL § 42.20[4][b] (Matthew Bender 3d ed.
2013) (discussing how bifurcation may further convenience).
203. Gasoline Prods. Co. v. Champlin Ref. Co., 283 U.S. 494, 500 (1931) (citing
Norfolk S. R.R. Co. v. Ferebee, 238 U.S. 269, 274 (1915)).
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IV. EFFECTS AND IMPLICATIONS OF BIFURCATION
North Carolina’s new law creates a chasm not only between North
Carolina and other states but also between North Carolina and federal
jurisprudence. The wisdom of such a move is unclear. There is little
consensus on the value of bifurcation in general, and as one federal court
described:
Those who favor the trial of liability separate from damages in personal
injury actions emphasize the time savings, and also suggest that in
theory there should be no difference in the eventual outcome of the case.
But an equally impressive argument is advanced that in many cases,
especially personal injury negligence cases, the separation might affect
the outcome of the case.204

Weighing these considerations, the Third Circuit “disapprove[d] of a
general practice of bifurcating all negligence cases.”205 More generally,
the scholarly debate in favor of and against bifurcation rages strong
across the country.206
According to the Connecticut Health Care Advisory Board, the
traditional system of non-bifurcation “implicitly implies the assumption
of wrongdoing.”207 It is somewhat ironic that civil defendants claim that
non-bifurcated proceedings imply fault while criminal defendants claim
that bifurcated proceedings imply the same thing. Yet North Carolina’s
new law may imply “right-doing.” In other words, jurors will be left to
analyze a defendant’s liability in a vacuum, without the benefit of a full
view on the consequences of the defendant’s actions. Of course, that
may be the very purpose of bifurcation for some supporters. The theory
in favor of bifurcation is that when jurors disagree on liability, an award
of damages becomes a “bartering mechanism” through which jurors can
settle their differences.208 Thus, the theory goes, jurors improperly

204. Lis v. Robert Packer Hosp., 579 F.2d 819, 824 (3d Cir. 1978).
205. Id.
206. Compare Steven S. Gensler, Bifurcation Unbound, 75 WASH. L. REV. 705 (2000)
(presenting a very strong case in favor of bifurcation), with Jennifer M. Granholm &
William J. Richards, Bifurcated Justice: How Trial-Splitting Devices Defeat the Jury’s Role,
26 U. TOL. L. REV. 505 (1995) (presenting a very strong case against bifurcation). See
generally John P. Rowley III & Richard G. Moore, Bifurcation of Civil Trials, 45 U. RICH.
L. REV. 1 (2010) (citing many of the relevant opinions in favor of and against
bifurcation).
207. Final Report to Governor Rell and the General Assembly, CONN. HEALTH CARE
ADVISORY BD., 19 (June 30, 2010), http://www.ct.gov/dph/lib/dph/final_report_advisory_
brd_june2010.pdf.
208. De Villiers, supra note 2, at 178.
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compromise to find liability in exchange for a lesser award of damages.209
Those in the field refer to this phenomenon as “vicarious settlement.”210
Proponents of bifurcation therefore assume that bifurcation will
benefit litigants (in other words, defendants) by leading to more just
results and will benefit judges by shortening the length of litigation.211
But some have recognized that bifurcation may actually create, rather
than solve, these problems. The Antitrust Section of the American Bar
Association has identified several problems with bifurcation, including
the admissibility of evidence that would otherwise be excluded,
increased willingness of judges to admit evidence of a defendant’s
financial condition, and procedural complications on appeal.212
Furthermore, separating a trial into two phases may cause delay,
confusion, and prejudice to the plaintiff.213
As in the criminal context, civil bifurcation may spawn as many
concerns as it dispels. This issue can be seen in the varying results of
empirical studies intended to measure the effect of bifurcation. In the
civil context, the three principal studies “suggest that bifurcated juries
tend to find the defendant liable less often than in comparable
nonbifurcated trials.”214 But when the defendant is found liable, the
awarded damages (both compensatory and punitive) are significantly
higher.215 This result is somewhat unsurprising, as several studies have
found that an award of damages has some correlation to the
reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct.216 If the jury does not hear
about the reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct, then the jury is

209.
210.
211.
212.

See id. at 172–73.
Id. at 173.
See id. at 197.
ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, PUNITIVE DAMAGES AND BUSINESS TORTS: A
PRACTITIONER’S HANDBOOK 94 (Thomas J. Collin ed., 1998).
213. Id. at 84.
214. Dennis J. Devine et al., Jury Decision Making: 45 Years of Empirical Research on
Deliberating Groups, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 662, 671 (2001).
215. See id. at 672 (noting that in “civil trials, bifurcation tends to reduce the odds of a
defendant being found liable but appears to foster larger damage awards when the
defendant is deemed liable”). Some research refutes this argument, however. See, e.g.,
Edith Greene et al., Compensating Plaintiffs and Punishing Defendants: Is Bifurcation
Necessary?, 24 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 187, 197–98 (2000) (finding that “trial structure had
no effect on compensatory damages”). Greene and her colleagues also found that
“[c]ontrary to the assumptions of many commentators, evidence related to punitive
damages did not prejudice mock jurors’ thinking about compensatory damages.” Id. at
201.
216. See Greene et al., supra note 215, at 196–97, 201.
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less likely to find the defendant liable.217 In the criminal arena, however,
bifurcated proceedings may make juries more likely to convict.218 No
research has yet analyzed this discrepancy.
This Article is certainly not the first to recognize a parallel between
bifurcation in criminal and civil contexts. “In the context of criminal
law, bifurcation of the guilt and punishment phases of trial is accepted as
a procedure necessary in many instances to satisfy due process. The
similarities between the process of deciding civil liability and criminal
guilt are numerous.”219 However, the analogy may be more apt between
criminal sentencing and punitive damages, as both are intended to
punish the defendant and deter additional wrongdoing.220
Compensatory damages, on the other hand, are not intended to punish
the defendant at all.221
Still, a law such as North Carolina’s that institutes a presumption in
favor of bifurcation has implications for all parties involved in
litigation—judges, plaintiffs, defendants, and juries.222 Bifurcation
creates a morass of complex issues including potential prejudice to the
parties, the necessity of additional evidentiary rulings, the pursuit of
judicial economy, and the role of the jury. These issues are discussed
below.
A. Prejudice—To Either Party
The traditional theory of civil bifurcation is that it helps the
defendant by removing the emotional and sympathetic factor concerning

217. See id. at 200–01.
218. See generally Verla Seetin Neslund, Comment, The Bifurcated Trial: Is It Used
More Than It Is Useful?, 31 EMORY L.J. 441, 441–42 (1982) (noting how opponents of
bifurcation in criminal trials argue that it is impossible for juries to draw the line
between guilt and sanity, thus generally leading to more convictions).
219. Tom Alan Cunningham & Paula K. Hutchinson, Bifurcated Trials: Creative Uses
of the Moriel Decision, 46 BAYLOR L. REV. 807, 809 (1994) (citation omitted).
220. See, e.g., Newton v. Standard Fire Ins. Co., 229 S.E.2d 297, 302 (N.C. 1976)
(“North Carolina has consistently allowed punitive damages solely on the basis of its
policy to punish intentional wrongdoing and to deter others from similar behavior.”).
221. FOWLER V. HARPER ET AL., HARPER JAMES & GRAY ON TORTS § 25.1 (3d ed. 2007)
(“The cardinal principle of damages in Anglo-American law is that of compensation for
the injury caused to the plaintiff by the defendant’s breach of duty.”) (emphasis in
original).
222. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1A-1, Rule 42(b)(3) (2013).
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the plight of the plaintiff from the jury’s deliberations.223 While
bifurcation may actually prejudice the plaintiff as a result, it may have
the unexpected potential for prejudicing the defendant as well.
Bifurcation may hurt or help a plaintiff, depending on the strength
of the evidence and the “distribution of risk attitudes” among the
jurors.224 If the evidence of liability is weak or unclear, bifurcation will
prejudice the plaintiff by removing from the jury any evidence of injury
and any proclivity toward sympathy.225 Furthermore, if the jury is
already inclined to mistrust personal injury or tort plaintiffs, then
bifurcation could prejudice the plaintiff for the same reasons.226 The
result will, of course, turn on the facts of the case—both before and
during trial.
Additional prejudice to the plaintiff may be evident in a less visible
but similarly concrete way. There is something to be said for an injured
plaintiff having an opportunity to have his day in court to say, “This is
what you did to me.” Regardless of whether the defendant is found
liable, there is often a need for psychological closure to a traumatic
event. Presenting evidence of damages may be precisely the thing for
which a plaintiff is looking, regardless of the ultimate outcome.
Bifurcation is not intended to take away a plaintiff’s right to a jury
trial, but bifurcation may muddy the waters when one considers its
practical implications. For example, under North Carolina’s new
legislation, the trial judge will have to determine whether proffered
evidence relates “solely to compensatory damages.”227 Yet the plaintiff
seeking to prove negligence must prove four essential elements: duty,
breach of duty, proximate cause, and damages.228 Thus, a plaintiff might
find itself in the awkward position of losing the opportunity to present
evidence on an essential element of its claim. Recognizing this difficulty,
the Tenth Circuit avoided the argument by deciding a case on other
grounds.229 Other courts have denied motions to bifurcate because proof
223. See de Villiers, supra note 2, at 191 (noting that “[c]ommentators have attributed
the observation that unitary trials lead to more liability verdicts than bifurcated trials to
the possibility of jury sympathy for the plaintiff”).
224. Id. at 158.
225. See id.
226. See id.
227. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1A-1, Rule 42(b).
228. See, e.g., Estate of Mullis v. Monroe Oil Co., 505 S.E.2d 131, 135–38 (N.C. 1998)
(discussing general negligence principles).
229. See Easton v. City of Boulder, 776 F.2d 1441, 1447 (10th Cir. 1985) (declining
to decide whether bifurcation prejudiced the plaintiff by precluding him from presenting
evidence of damages because the issue of probable cause was dispositive of his claim).
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of damages is an essential element of a plaintiff’s claim.230 Still other
courts have attempted to distinguish “[p]roof of damage” from
“calculation of damages.”231 But the North Carolina General Assembly
has not given any guidance on how to address these issues. Plaintiffs in
North Carolina, and their attorneys, may be asking themselves how they
can avoid a directed verdict when they are not permitted to offer
evidence of injury.232 “The substantive law applicable in [the field of
torts] makes actual damage a prerequisite to a plaintiff’s right of
action[,]”233 yet in some ways, bifurcation makes actual damage an
afterthought.
An extreme example of this difficulty can be seen in the case of
Chartone, Inc. v. Bernini, arising out of the state courts of Arizona.234 The
underlying claim in the case was relatively straightforward—personal
injury attorneys alleged that two companies charged unreasonable fees
to produce medical records.235 Before trial, the judge granted the
attorneys’ motion to bifurcate the proceedings into liability and damages
phases.236 During the liability phase, the parties were not allowed to
introduce evidence relating to damages.237 The companies moved for
judgment as a matter of law, arguing that the attorneys had no evidence
of damages and had thus failed to establish an essential element of their
claim.238 The judge decided to appoint a special master to determine the
230. See, e.g., Cooper Tire & Rubber Co. v. Farese, No. 3:02CV210-SA, 2008 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 44577, at *2–3 (N.D. Miss. June 5, 2008) (denying motion to bifurcate
because proof of damages was essential element of tortious interference claim); see also
Doctors Hosp. Surgery Ctr., L.P. v. Webb, 704 S.E.2d 185, 189 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010)
(recognizing that even the liability phase requires some individualized determination of
injury).
231. See, e.g., In re Merrill Lynch, 191 F.R.D. 391, 396 (D.N.J. 1999) (noting the
importance of differentiating between the presence of damage from the extent of
damages (citing Sowell v. Butcher & Singer, Inc. 926 F.2d 289, 297 (3d Cir. 1991)));
Feldman v. Jackson Mem’l Hosp., 571 F. Supp. 1000, 1009 (S.D. Fla. 1983) (stating that
plaintiff must prove “the fact of damage”); Martino v. McDonald’s Sys., Inc., 86 F.R.D.
145, 147 (N.D. Ill. 1980) (emphasizing how the “fact of damage question is distinct from
the issue of actual damages”).
232. See, e.g., Gulesian v. Ne. Bank of Lincoln, 447 A.2d 814, 817 (Me. 1982)
(affirming defendant’s motion for a directed verdict “[b]ecause there was no evidence in
the record of damages proximately caused by the [defendant]”).
233. HARPER ET AL., supra note 221, § 25.1.
234. See Chartone, Inc. v. Bernini, 83 P.3d 1103 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004).
235. Id. at 1105.
236. Id. (ordering that the trial would be bifurcated, but that the same jury would
hear both phases if liability was found).
237. Id.
238. Id. at 1106.
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proper amount of damages if the jury found the companies liable, and,
in response, it was the same companies that argued “they had been
prejudiced in conducting their defense by defending only on the
question of liability and not damages.”239
Upon review, the Arizona Court of Appeals criticized the judge’s
handling of the case.240 The appellate court realized that “some evidence
was precluded on the ground it related to damages, not liability. Yet, at
the end of the trial, the judge maintained that evidence relating to
damages had been admitted, essentially penalizing [the companies] for
failing to establish factual issues relating to damages.”241 The appellate
court concluded that “because [the companies] had justifiably believed
they were only trying the issue of liability, it was unfair to penalize them
for conducting their defense accordingly.”242 The court remanded the
matter for a trial on damages alone.243
Under North Carolina’s new legislation, situations like the one in
Chartone are more and more likely to appear. Complicated issues
regarding what evidence relates to injury and what evidence relates to
causation will be inherent in most tort cases. Bifurcation in some
instances may actually deprive a party of a right to a fair trial under the
Seventh Amendment of the United States Constitution. But there is no
indication that the North Carolina General Assembly considered that
implication when it cavalierly passed this new law.
Bifurcation is ostensibly for the benefit of the defendant, yet it is
sometimes the plaintiff that also seeks bifurcation.244 Such a maneuver
may be a plaintiff’s effort to protect itself, but it may also be an example
of how bifurcation can prejudice the defendant.
Indeed, defendants may actually stand to lose by bifurcating a trial.
According to some research, “the expected damage award for bifurcated
trials conditional upon a finding of liability against the defendant is greater
than the corresponding conditional expectation for unitary trials.”245 It
seems to be true that plaintiffs win more unitary trials than bifurcated

239. Id.
240. Id. at 1111.
241. Id.
242. Id. at 1112.
243. Id. at 1114.
244. See, e.g., Erie Ins. Exch. v. Bledsoe, 540 S.E.2d 57, 59 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000)
(granting plaintiff’s motion to bifurcate its declaratory judgment action from defendant’s
counterclaims); see also Price v. Cannon Mills, No. C-84-1012-S, 1986 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
18024, at *19 (M.D.N.C. Nov. 6, 1986) (denying plaintiff’s motion to bifurcate trial).
245. De Villiers, supra note 2, at 189 (emphasis in original).
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trials.246 When liability is found, however, the damage awards are
usually higher in bifurcated trials than in unitary trials.247
Moreover, some courts have recommended bifurcation as a way to
lessen the prejudice to the plaintiff rather than the defendant. For
example, in Taylor v. RaceTrac Petroleum, Inc., the Court of Appeals of
Georgia chastened the trial court for denying a motion to bifurcate and
remarked that “[t]he better practice would have been to bifurcate the
trial.”248 In Taylor, a man was killed in a car accident, and the defendant
company had sold alcohol to the driver of the other vehicle.249 The
company introduced evidence regarding the decedent’s prior drug and
alcohol abuse and reckless driving, apparently in an attempt to shield
itself from liability.250 Aside from the relevancy problems, the court
explained that even if the evidence were relevant to damages, it should
have been separated into a separate damage proceeding to avoid
prejudice to the plaintiff.251 In this situation, bifurcation may actually
prejudice the defendant by taking away its ability to present all relevant
facts to the jury.
Thus, both sides may be prejudiced by bifurcating the liability
phase from the damages phase. Yet bifurcation is purportedly instituted
“to ‘avoid prejudice,’ not to create it.”252 If it is shown that a general
practice of bifurcation is prejudicial to the plaintiff or the defendant,
such a practice deserves a second look.
B. Evidentiary Problems
Generally, bifurcation is not allowed when evidence on the issues
overlaps or the issues are so “intertwined” that attempts at separation
will actually lead to more confusion and less efficiency.253 Conversely,
bifurcation is generally permitted if the two subjects are not
intertwined.254 According to the North Carolina General Assembly,
therefore, evidence of liability and evidence of damages will not be

246. Id. at 191.
247. Id.
248. Taylor v. RaceTrac Petroleum, Inc., 519 S.E.2d 282, 285 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999).
249. Id. at 283.
250. Id. at 284.
251. Id. at 285.
252. U.S. Gypsum Co. v. Schiavo Bros., Inc., 668 F.2d 172, 181 (3d Cir. 1981) (citing
FED. R. CIV. P. 42(b)).
253. See WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 201, § 2390.
254. See id.
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intertwined in tort cases in which the plaintiff seeks more than $150,000
in damages.255 That assumption necessitates a closer examination.
A hypothetical example might make this evidentiary problem more
concrete.256 Peter is a twelve-year-old boy who is riding in a vehicle that
is involved in a head-on collision. As a result of the collision, the
vehicle’s spare tire is dislodged, hits the seat in which Peter is sitting,
and renders him a paraplegic. Peter’s parents bring suit against the
vehicle’s manufacturer, alleging that the system intended to keep the
spare tire in place was defective. Peter’s expert witness proposes to
testify that the impact from the tire was the primary cause of Peter’s
injuries and that Peter would not be a paraplegic if he had not been hit
by the tire.
Assuming the trial is bifurcated under the new law, what evidence
is about liability and what evidence is about damages? Would Peter’s
expert witness be permitted to testify that a dislodged tire could cause
paraplegia? Could he testify that Peter would not have been injured in
absence of the impact? Or would the testimony be limited to potential
injuries that could be caused by a dislodged tire? If the latter, would
Peter be receiving a fair trial? Furthermore, would Peter need to hire a
separate expert to testify at the latter damages portion, or would he be
required to have the same expert make a second appearance?
Perhaps liability and damages are not as easily separated as the
North Carolina General Assembly believes. At least in the discovery
context, courts have recognized that the issues are not totally “separate
and distinct.”257 When evidence overlaps between the issues of liability
and damages, bifurcation is generally not appropriate.258 In other words,
“[b]ifurcation is usually not ordered when the issues of liability and
255. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1A-1, Rule 42(b)(3) (2013).
256. This example is taken from the case of Thorndike v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., No.
00-198-B, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8203 (D. Me. May 15, 2003).
257. See, e.g., Kimberly-Clark Worldwide, Inc. v. First Quality Baby Prods., LLC, No.
09-C-0916, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98573, at *5 (E.D. Wis. Sept. 7, 2010) (“Another
reason to deny bifurcation is that damages and liability are not easily
compartmentalized. . . . Bifurcation would likely require the parties, and possibly this
Court, to wade into the morass inherent in drawing lines between discovery relevant to
damages and discovery relevant to liability.”); BASF Catalysts LLC v. Aristo, Inc., No.
2:07-cv-222, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16263, at *5 (N.D. Ind. Mar. 2, 2009)
(“Postponement does not equate with economy. In fact, many courts have noted that
bifurcation can lead to additional discovery disputes that actually add time and costs to
the litigation.”).
258. See, e.g., R.E. Linder Steel Erection Co. v. Wedemeyer, Cernik, Corrubia, Inc.,
585 F. Supp. 1530, 1534 (D. Md. 1984) (refusing to bifurcate when the plaintiff intended
to use “some of the same witnesses” on the issues of liability and damages).
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damages are intertwined and witnesses who testify regarding liability can
also be expected to testify as to damages.”259 The General Assembly has
not provided any reason to conclude that the issues of liability and
damages are generally not intertwined in tort cases, yet the law assumes
that they can be easily distinguished.260 Courts have recognized, though,
that in some instances, “factors concerning the cause and nature of the
injuries would, unavoidably, have been adduced at a separate trial on
liability.”261 It is far from clear that evidence of liability and evidence of
damages can be as easily separated as the General Assembly assumed.
Furthermore, the same problems that plague voir dire procedures in
the criminal context are present, to some degree, in the civil context.
For example, “in a trial where the plaintiff claims a cancer due to trauma,
[counsel] could hardly be prevented from explaining the nature of the
injury in order to find out whether the attitude of the panel is opposed
to traumatic etiology in such diseases.”262 In other words, a description
of the injury may be necessary to ascertain jurors’ views on the claimed
injury, much like a description of the sentencing proceeding in a capital
murder case may be necessary to ascertain jurors’ views on the death
penalty. Does such evidence relate “solely” to compensatory damages, or
does the voir dire procedure bring it beyond that scope? If the former, it
should not be permitted under the new law.263
In a similar vein, evidence of damages may be necessary for a
certain inference to be made. For example, the injuries received by a
party in an automobile accident are likely “relating solely to
compensatory damages.”264 Yet those same injuries are also indicative of
how fast the other vehicle was traveling. The propriety of excluding
such evidence has not been established, and courts will have to grapple
with these and similar issues under the new law.
“Certainly, where evidence of damages is extraordinarily complex or
time consuming and it is not necessary to deal with it during the liability
phase, bifurcation of liability and damages makes good sense.”265 But
even if that is true, a presumption in favor of bifurcation, such as North

259. Drumm v. Schell, No. 4:07-CV-357, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45920, at *3 (M.D.
Pa. June 11, 2008).
260. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1A-1, Rule 42(b)(3).
261. Hardee Mfg. Co. v. Josey, 535 So. 2d 655, 656 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
262. Jack B. Weinstein, Routine Bifurcation of Jury Negligence Trials: An Example of the
Questionable Use of Rule Making Power, 14 VAND. L. REV. 831, 849 (1961).
263. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1A-1, Rule 42(b).
264. Id.
265. Cunningham & Hutchinson, supra note 219, at 815.
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Carolina’s, assumes that in all tort cases the evidence of damages is
extraordinarily complex or time consuming.
The evidentiary
implications of bifurcation in the ordinary course of things have yet to
be delineated, and North Carolina courts now find themselves faced with
yet another daunting task.
As Judge Weinstein predicted back in 1961, “[t]he attempt to seal
off the jury treatment of liability will probably be met by the
development of new techniques and strategies to introduce evidence of
injuries during the trial of the liability issue.”266 Litigants in North
Carolina will now have the opportunity and the motivation to fulfill
Judge Weinstein’s prophecy.
C. Judicial Economy
Another proffered reason to bifurcate trials is to promote judicial
economy. If a defendant is not found liable, a second phase on damages
is unnecessary. Even if the defendant is found liable, the parties may be
more likely to settle. Thus, the theory goes, bifurcation serves to
shorten the length of trial and save the resources of both the parties and
the courts.267 But this assumption also deserves closer inspection.
Empirical evidence does suggest that bifurcation actually shortens
the length of trials.268 In 1959, a federal court in Illinois imposed a local
rule that any party could move for a separate trial on the issue of
liability.269 In response to this rule, a study was conducted to determine
the amount of time that would be saved by separating the issues.270 Of
186 personal injury cases tried in front of a jury during the study period,
sixty-nine (or thirty-seven percent) were bifurcated into liability and
damages phases.271 Of the non-bifurcated cases, seventy-eight percent
continued to the end of the trial; of the bifurcated cases, only fifteen
percent did.272 After attempting to control for several variables, the
authors of the study concluded that bifurcation “will save, on the
average, about 20 per cent [sic] of the time that would be required if
these cases were tried under traditional [one-phase] rules.”273
266. Weinstein, supra note 262, at 852.
267. See Hans Zeisel & Thomas Callahan, Split Trials and Time Saving: A Statistical
Analysis, 76 HARV. L. REV. 1606, 1606 n.3 (1963).
268. Id. at 1624.
269. Id. at 1606–07.
270. Id. at 1607.
271. Id. at 1609.
272. Id. at 1610.
273. Id. at 1624.
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No study has contradicted that finding, and yet it is still
incomplete.274 For example, the authors of the study did not consider the
length of time that passed before trial.275 A statutory mandate, such as
North Carolina’s, will certainly move parties, usually defendants, to seek
bifurcation.276 Judges will then have to determine additional issues,
including: (1) whether the opposing party can show good cause to avoid
bifurcation, (2) whether discovery should be bifurcated between liability
and damages, and (3) exactly what evidence will or will not be permitted
in the liability phase.277 These decisions will likely entail hearings and
additional time, but those considerations are not considered in the
general argument that bifurcation shortens the length of trials.278 Given
these additional factors, one wonders whether under laws like North
Carolina’s “little if any time, expense or burden would be spared.”279
In the ordinary tort case, the issue of damages may be less complex
than the issue of liability. Assuming the defendant is liable, it could be a
comparatively straightforward task to determine the amount that the
plaintiff should be compensated. Hence, when other courts have
considered motions to bifurcate the damages phase, they have
recognized that “the savings might amount to only a day of testimony.
Such savings would evaporate should the damages phase become
necessary. Furthermore, bifurcation requires a certain degree of
duplication of efforts by the parties, counsel, and the Court.”280 Thus,
even if the actual time spent in trial decreases, that is not to say that
judicial economy is necessarily served. Indeed, “the mere possibility that
a trial on damages may become unnecessary does not establish that the
bifurcation promotes judicial economy.”281

274. See generally Landsman et al., supra note 24 (discussing several of the limitations
of the study and questions that it has spawned).
275. See Zeisel & Callahan, supra note 267, at 1624.
276. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1A-1, Rule 42(b)(3) (2013).
277. Albert P. Bedecarre, Comment, Rule 42(b) Bifurcation At an Extreme:
Polyfurcation of Liability Issues in Environmental Tort Cases, 17 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV.
123, 135, 160−62 (1989).
278. See Zeisel & Callahan, supra note 267, at 1624 (omitting in the conclusion that
bifurcation shortens trials the likely necessary argument and additional time required for
judges to determine these issues).
279. Diagnostic Devices, Inc. v. TaiDoc Tech. Corp., No. 3:08cv149-RJC-DCK, 2010
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70282, at *13 (W.D.N.C. June 18, 2010).
280. Kelley v. Steel Transp., Inc., No. 09-CV-14318, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47869, at
*13–14 (E.D. Mich. May 4, 2011).
281. Grand Trunk W. R.R. v. Cothern, No. L-93-112, 1995 Ohio App. LEXIS 926, at
*12 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 17, 1995).
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Moreover, it is uncertain whether bifurcation aids or hinders
settlement. At least one court found it important to ensure discovery of
both liability and damages because a full understanding of damages “not
only assists the parties in preparing for trial, it also educates each party
on the other’s view of the damages, which, in turn, assists each party in
evaluating essential elements of the matters in issue and in assessing the
risks associated with an adverse decision in the action.”282 Thus, a
unitary trial may actually facilitate settlement, thereby serving judicial
economy. Other courts have found, however, that bifurcation may help
settlement because once liability is determined, “the knowledge of the
liability verdict and the savings in cost of expensive damage discovery
will provide both room and the means for compromise.”283
A bifurcated proceeding merely modifies, rather than eliminates,
much of the pre-trial debate. If evidence on damages is precluded until a
later proceeding in which it is deemed necessary, parties may avoid
fighting over certain expert witnesses, evidence of injuries, and damage
calculations. However, those debates would simply be replaced with
debates over what evidence will be admitted in the liability phase—
specifically, what will and will not be permitted. Once again, it is
unclear whether bifurcation actually serves to promote judicial
economy.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, if the entire purpose of
bifurcation is to expedite tort litigation, then the provision may be
proper.284 But if there is more at stake, such as prejudice to either party
and preservation of the jury’s role, then a closer examination is required
before North Carolina or other states enact such a drastic change in
litigation practice. “While economy and convenience may properly be
considered in the decision to bifurcate, neither is the ultimate
objective.”285 Indeed, “[a] paramount consideration at all times in the
administration of justice is a fair and impartial trial to all litigants.
Considerations of economy of time, money and convenience of
witnesses must yield thereto.”286 In its haste, the North Carolina General
282. Johns Hopkins Univ. v. CellPro, 160 F.R.D. 30, 35 (D. Del. 1995).
283. F&G Scrolling Mouse, L.L.C. v. IBM Corp., 190 F.R.D. 385, 392 (M.D.N.C.
1999); see also Industrias Metalicas Marva, Inc. v. Lausell, 172 F.R.D. 1, 5−6, 8 (D.P.R.
1997) (finding that bifurcation may promote judicial economy by, among other things,
facilitating settlement).
284. Zeisel & Callahan, supra note 267, at 1624.
285. Martin v. Bell Helicopter Co., 85 F.R.D. 654, 658 (D. Colo. 1980).
286. Id. (quoting Baker v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 11 F.R.D. 440, 441 (S.D.N.Y. 1951));
see also Weinstein, supra note 262, at 832 (“The bifurcation rule . . . has within it
potentialities for a major change in the relative position of plaintiffs and defendants in
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Assembly may have missed the importance of that paramount
consideration.
D. The Jury’s Perspective
While the three issues described above have received significant
attention in the literature, little has been said about how the juries
themselves are affected by bifurcation. Courts have recognized that “the
traditional role of the factfinder [is] to make an ultimate determination
on the basis of the case presented in its entirety.”287 The jury is expected
to listen to all of the evidence and make a reasoned decision that
represents the will of the public at large.288 Thus, federal courts have
expressed concern that bifurcation “would cause greater delay and might
complicate the proceedings by creating a piecemeal quality to the trial,
making it harder for the trier of fact to see the case as a whole.”289
Mandatory bifurcation does not take away the fact that the evidence in a
unitary proceeding may give a more complete picture of what really
happened. From the jury’s point of view, for example, seeing how much
someone actually suffered may be necessary to determine whether the
defendant’s action was a proximate cause of injury sufficient to impose
liability.
The rules on remand recognize the importance of the jury’s
perspective.290 As explained earlier, courts on remand can only retry a
solitary issue if the remaining issues are completely separate and
distinct.291 According to one commentator, “[t]he particular frailties of
juries, while decried by some, were not the overriding concern of the
Court in making this decision. The Court focused instead on avoiding
confusion of the trier of fact due to incomplete information.”292 Perhaps
similar consideration should be given to the jury’s role in the first
instance.

negligence cases and the rule cannot be appraised merely by procedural efficiency tests
which might be appropriate for other proposed procedures.”).
287. Real v. Bunn-o-Matic Corp., 195 F.R.D. 618, 620 (N.D. Ill. 2000) (emphasis
added).
288. See 47 AM. JUR. 2D Jury § 2 (2013).
289. Belmont Textile Mach. Co. v. Superba, S.A., 48 F. Supp. 2d 521, 526 (W.D.N.C.
1999).
290. See Jones v. Harrelson & Smith Contractors, LLC, 670 S.E.2d 242, 252 (N.C. Ct.
App. 2008).
291. See Land v. Land, 687 S.E.2d 511, 516 (N.C. Ct. App. 2010).
292. Bedecarre, supra note 277, at 129.
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Bifurcation is also intended to help the jury make a more logical
decision without being swayed by sympathy for the injured party.293 But
torts such as “[w]rongful death actions, in and of themselves, are
sufficient to evoke the sympathy of most juries. The fact that such
actions necessarily involve testimony related to the death of a mother,
father or child does not require bifurcation of the liability and damage
issues.”294 Sympathy, in and of itself, is not a sufficient reason to
bifurcate all tort proceedings. Jurors are already instructed to make their
decision based on the facts and “not be swayed by pity, sympathy,
partiality or public opinion.”295 North Carolina’s new law implicitly
assumes that juries do not or cannot follow that charge.
Protecting against jury sympathy may have more of a role in nontort cases in any event. A jury determining whether a defendant has
breached a contract or violated a criminal statute should not be swayed
by the effect on the alleged victim. But a jury determining whether a
defendant acted reasonably under the circumstances may want to know
how that reasonable or unreasonable action affected others, even if, in
theory, the determination of liability should not be swayed by the
resultant damages.296 An otherwise unreasonable risk seems a lot more
reasonable if it does not harm anyone. Conversely, an otherwise
reasonable risk seems unreasonable when it harms others a great deal.
While it could be argued that the effects of conduct should not taint a
jury’s determination of reasonableness, it is also arguable that jurors
make a less-informed decision without the benefit of all of the
information.
In addition, North Carolina’s highest court presumes that jurors
follow a trial court’s instructions.297 The General Assembly did not
explain why that presumption was inadequate in tort claims involving
damages more than $150,000. Indeed, courts usually recognize that
jurors are often asked to make contingent determinations.298 In any trial,
293. See Grand Trunk W. R.R. v. Cothern, No. L-93-112, 1995 Ohio App. LEXIS 926,
at *12 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 17, 1995).
294. Id.
295. North Carolina Pattern Jury Instructions, Civil § 150.12 (2012).
296. Note, Separation of Issues of Liability and Damages in Personal Injury Cases: An
Attempt to Combat Congestion by Rule of Court, 46 IOWA L. REV. 815, 827 (1961)
(“Perhaps it can be said unequivocally that juries have no business considering the extent
of damages in deciding the issue of liability.”).
297. Scarborough v. Dillard’s, Inc., 693 S.E.2d 640, 651 (N.C. 2009) (TimmonsGoodson, J., dissenting) (quoting State v. Cummings, 536 S.E.2d 36, 53 (N.C. 2000)).
298. United States v. Au Optronics Corp., No. C 09-00110 SI, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
77494, at *15 (N.D. Cal. July 18, 2011).
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bifurcated or not, the justice system expects a jury to determine whether
the defendant is liable and then determine the extent of the plaintiff’s
injuries. To protect the jury system itself, courts “invoke a ‘presumption’
that jurors understand and follow their instructions.”299 As the
Honorable Frank Easterbrook explained, “this is not a bursting bubble,
applicable only in the absence of better evidence. It is a rule of law—a
description of the premises underlying the jury system, rather than a
proposition about jurors’ abilities and states of mind.”300
This
foundational principle remains true, even if juries reach compromise
verdicts that are the foundation of the theory in support of bifurcation.301
The difference between bifurcation and ordinary jury instructions is that
in a bifurcated setting, “the jury cannot fill the void created by the
court’s ruling.”302 Whether that problem is a negative or is a positive for
the jury system remains to be determined, but it is, at the very least, an
issue to consider.
Some have further argued that bifurcation actually helps the jury by
making a trial more manageable and by giving the jurors more discrete
issues to decide.303 However, research has not always shown that to be
the case.304 One study found that “bifurcation does not enhance memory
of compensatory case facts and most legal instructions about
compensatory damages.”305 And it is often the most difficult cases that
reach the jury in the first place.306 Once again, it is unclear what effect
bifurcation has on the jurors themselves.
Knowledge of the bifurcation will affect the way that jurors react to
testimony. Judge Weinstein provided this helpful commentary:
Many of the advantages foreseen from split trials might well be lost, if it
is known that the same jury is to be used. Some jurors are rather
sophisticated and they might well inform their fellows that they ought to
find for the plaintiff if they wanted to hear the medical testimony and
give the plaintiff “something” even though he might have been partly
responsible for the accident.307

299. Gacy v. Welborn, 994 F.2d 305, 313 (7th Cir. 1993).
300. Id.
301. See id. (“Jurors reach compromise verdicts, although they aren’t supposed to.”).
302. Granholm & Richards, supra note 206, at 510.
303. Bedecarre, supra note 277, at 138–41.
304. Landsman et al., supra note 24, at 333.
305. Id.
306. See, e.g., Robert MacCoun, Inside the Black Box: What Empirical Research Tells Us
about Decisionmaking by Civil Juries, in VERDICT: ASSESSING THE CIVIL JURY SYSTEM 137,
140 (Robert E. Litan ed., 1993).
307. Weinstein, supra note 262, at 849.
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Conversely, sophisticated jurors might also realize that finding in favor
of the plaintiff means that they will have to endure another set of
evidence and another set of deliberations. As a result, some jurors may
be tempted to find in favor of the defendant simply to shorten their own
time in the jury box. Subconsciously or consciously, then, the
bifurcated procedure affects the way that jurors view a trial.
In addition to how jurors independently view a bifurcated trial, the
defendant may use bifurcation as a sword, rather than as a shield, only to
further exacerbate this problem. Defendants could use bifurcation as a
tool to manipulate jurors to find in their favor. This possibility can be
seen in one recent case in which the defendant made this closing
argument in the liability phase of a bifurcated trial: “If you answer ‘yes’
to any of these issues, [plaintiff’s counsel] will talk about another phase
of this trial, okay? And we’re back for another phase of this trial, okay?
Got to answer the first six issues ‘no.’”308 If there was any doubt as to
whether the jurors understood the implications of the first decision,
such doubt was wholly obliterated through the defendant’s frank
statement. The judicial system trusts jurors to make fair and deliberate
decisions, but common sense may push jurors to get out of jury duty as
quickly as possible.
V. NORTH CAROLINA’S PREDICAMENT
Not only does North Carolina’s judicial system face problems
associated with jurors’ views of bifurcation, but it also must battle
through the unknown and possibly unintended consequences of
adopting such a novel rule. North Carolina lawyers and judges will be
the first to encounter any unanticipated problems as they interpret the
new statute without any guidance from the General Assembly. This Part
first describes the difficulties with North Carolina being the only state to
have such a provision. It then offers a suggestion for judges attempting
to apply the provision and a suggestion for other states considering such
a change in their litigation procedure.
A. Unwisely Breaking New Ground
North Carolina’s adoption of the new law, creating a presumption
in favor of bifurcated trials, contradicts the established rules in the

308. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant at 36, Muteff v. Invacare Corp., 721 S.E. 2d 379
(N.C. Ct. App. 2012) (No. COA 11-495).
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The Sixth Circuit admonished that
majority of jurisdictions.309
bifurcation “should be resorted to only in the exercise of informed
discretion and in a case and at a juncture which move the court to
conclude that such action will really further convenience or avoid
prejudice.”310 Furthermore, the new law contravenes what other
jurisdictions have long accepted as the preferred procedural practice.
For example, it is “a settled principle in Texas law [that] liability and
damage issues are so interrelated in a personal injury case that it is error
to try them separately.”311 Unlike the evidence relating to punitive
damages, the line between evidence of a defendant’s liability and the
evidence used to calculate compensatory damages is much harder to
demarcate.
In addition to the absence of any past or current precedent for
North Carolina’s decision, bifurcation of liability and compensatory
damages in tort cases is “[t]he most hotly debated development in issue
bifurcation, and the slowest to gain acceptance for common usage.”312
One wonders why the General Assembly adopted such a drastic change
in the most controversial area within tort law without so much as
conducting research into the rule’s efficacy, considering its future
implications, or providing any rationale for their decision. As of now,
the statute separates punitive damages and compensatory damages from
the question of liability, but is it a far leap for the General Assembly to
later bifurcate another piece of the trial, such as causation? This type of
“polyfurcation” is not necessarily in the public or the judicial system’s
best interest.313 North Carolina’s new presumption favoring bifurcation
creates an atmosphere of uncertainty for judges and lawyers as they try
to sort out the implications of the new law.
Although North Carolina is the only state to create a presumption
in favor of bifurcation by statute, New York has a clear policy favoring
bifurcation of liability from damages adopted by regulation.314 In New
York, “[j]udges are encouraged to order a bifurcated trial of the issues of
liability and damages in any action for personal injury where it appears
that bifurcation may assist in a clarification or simplification of issues
309. See, e.g., Rowley & Moore, supra note 206, at 6–9.
310. Moss v. Associated Transp., Inc., 344 F.2d 23, 26 (6th Cir. 1965) (quoting
Frasier v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 119 F. Supp. 495, 497 (D. Neb. 1954)).
311. Cunningham & Hutchinson, supra note 219, at 810 (citing Eubanks v. Winn,
420 S.W.2d 698, 701 (Tex. 1967)).
312. Bedecarre, supra note 277, at 134.
313. See generally id. (discussing the problems and implications associated with
“polyfurcation” under Rule 42(b)).
314. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 202.42 (2011).
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and a fair and more expeditious resolution of the action.”315 However,
even that standard has an exception, “where the nature of the injuries
has an important bearing on the question of liability.”316 Nevertheless, a
comprehensive national study, albeit a few years old, found that
bifurcation is still relatively rare.317 Perhaps there is a reason for the
majority of jurisdictions’ reluctance to encourage bifurcation of
compensatory damages from the defendant’s liability.
North Carolina’s adoption of a presumption in favor of bifurcation
also eliminates much of the judge’s discretion, which goes against the
traditional view of utilizing bifurcation only when it will decrease
prejudice and increase judicial efficiency. Courts have recognized that
in some instances jury sympathy is inevitable.318 Similarly, it may be
that the defendant has no likelihood of winning on the issue of liability
and, therefore, bifurcation would be improper.319 Or the opposite may
be true, such that bifurcation is appropriate in the interests of efficiency
and judicial economy when there is a clear showing that the plaintiff has
no likelihood of winning on the liability issue.320 However, on other
occasions, the issues of liability and damages will be so interrelated such
that bifurcation is not appropriate.321 The difficulty exists in the
establishment of a presumption of bifurcation, which largely removes
the discretion afforded to trial judges in every other aspect of the trial
proceedings.
The problem is not simply that North Carolina’s rule is different
than other jurisdictions, but that the General Assembly has forged ahead
with the new rule on bifurcation without analyzing the effect or value of
the old rules. For example, North Carolina, in contrast to every other
state, already had a separate rule of severance for cases against a

315. Id.
316. Fetterman v. Evans, 612 N.Y.S.2d 479, 480 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994) (citation
omitted).
317. Louis Harris et al., Judges’ Opinions on Procedural Issues: A Survey of State and
Federal Trial Judges Who Spend at Least Half Their Time on General Civil Cases, 69 B.U. L.
REV. 731, 734 (1989) (finding that, overall, “bifurcation is used only occasionally”).
318. Ake v. General Motors Corp., 942 F. Supp. 869, 877 (W.D.N.Y. 1996) (denying
motion to bifurcate because some evidence would be relevant to both phases and jury
sympathy would exist in any case, as jury in both phases would know that the decedent
had died in a fire).
319. See, e.g., Fetz v. E & L Truck Rental Co., 670 F. Supp. 261, 265–66 (S.D. Ind.
1987).
320. See, e.g., Hahn v. Woodlyn Fire Co., 32 F.R.D. 429, 431 (E.D. Pa. 1963).
321. See, e.g., Thorndike ex rel. Thorndike v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 220 F.R.D. 6, 8
(D. Me. 2004).
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managed-care entity.322 Under the managed-care rule, when a party
includes a claim involving a managed-care entity and files a motion, the
court must order “separate discovery and a separate trial of any claim,
cross-claim, counterclaim, or third-party claim.”323 Thus, bifurcation in
this situation is mandatory so long as a motion is made, and, given the
wording of the rule, there is little doubt as to the intended beneficiary of
such a provision. North Carolina is the only state to codify such a
requirement even though research has not been conducted into this
provision’s benefit.
Furthermore, and more conspicuously, North Carolina has already
separated the issue of liability for punitive damages from the issue of
liability for compensatory damages.324 In cases that must analyze
punitive damages, there may be less prejudice than in the liabilitydamages bifurcation because the type of evidence permitted in punitive
damages may cloud the issue of liability. One federal court found that
bifurcation of the liability and damages phases of a products liability trial
was not required when “exclusion of the evidence of other incidents and
the punitive damages claims reduced many of the prejudice and
complexity issues of concern to the defendant.”325 North Carolina,
however, has not attempted to undergo any systematic research into the
benefit of this type of bifurcation, even though it has been instituted for
more than ten years.
In contrast, one of the states that is dealing with bifurcation and
attempting to understand its consequences is Ohio.
Ohio is
investigating the constitutionality of a mandatory bifurcation provision
for punitive damages cases.326 During the oral argument in Flynn v.
Fairview Village Retirement Community, Ltd., counsel for the defendant
argued that both parties had a substantive right to a fair trial.327 Implicit
in that argument is that mandatory bifurcation provides a fair—or
fairer—trial, but nobody has attempted to explain whether that
322. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1A-1, Rule 42(b)(2) (2013).
323. Id.
324. Id. § 1D-30.
325. Nakajima v. General Motors Corp., 857 F. Supp. 100, 104 (D.D.C. 1994).
326. See Flynn v. Fairview Vill. Ret. Cmty., Ltd., 970 N.E.2d 927, 929 (Ohio 2012)
(per curiam) (noting that “[b]y denying appellants’ motions to bifurcate under R.C.
2315.21(B), the trial court implicitly determined that the S.B. 80 amendment to the
statutory provision is unconstitutional, i.e., that Civ.R. 42(B) prevails over the
conflicting statutory provision”).
327. Oral Argument at 8:05, Flynn v. Fairview Vill. Ret. Cmty., Ltd., 970 N.E.2d 927
(No. 2010-1881), available at http://www.supremecourtofohiomedialibrary.org/
Media.aspx?fileId=132902.
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assumption is accurate. Defendant’s counsel conceded that “[c]ertainly
there are going to be situations where some evidence lends itself into
both [compensatory and punitive damage analysis].”328 If that is the
case, then under most courts’ jurisprudence, including North Carolina’s,
bifurcation is not proper because the issues are not completely “separate
and distinct.”329
Additionally, some states have followed North Carolina’s example
and require bifurcation of punitive damages.330 Another example of
bifurcation across the states is the requirement of bifurcation of liability
insurance coverage from a damages claim against an insured.331 Overall,
states have imposed rules requiring bifurcation in a limited number of
specific cases, but North Carolina is the first state to impose such a
broad rule of bifurcation. In 2006, there was “no case holding that
courts are required to bifurcate all trials that involve questions of
liability as well as questions of damages.”332
Moreover, the policies behind bifurcating the issue of punitive
damages are largely different than the policy reasons for separating
liability determinations from compensatory damages. Legislatures333
have generally required, and courts334 have generally held, that some
safeguards are necessary to ensure that defendants are not burdened
with excessive punitive damages awards because punitive damages are
intended to punish the defendant rather than compensate the plaintiff.335
Bifurcating the punitive damages phase is one way to ensure that a jury
is only given information about the defendant’s net worth when deciding
the amount of punishment to be inflicted.336 Compensatory damages,
328. Id. at 9:44.
329. See, e.g., Land v. Land, 687 S.E.2d 511, 516 (N.C. Ct. App. 2010).
330. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-5.1 (2011); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03.2-11(2)
(2011).
331. See, e.g., ALA. R. CIV. P. 18(c).
332. Pouliot v. Paul Arpin Van Lines, Inc., 235 F.R.D. 537, 542 (D. Conn. 2006).
333. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1D-25 (2013) (requiring a statutory maximum of three times
the amount of compensatory damages or $250,000, whichever is greater, for punitive
damage awards).
334. See, e.g., BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 568 (1996) (applying due
process analysis to award of punitive damages when award is “grossly excessive”).
335. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1D-1 (“Punitive damages may be awarded . . . to punish a
defendant for egregiously wrongful acts and to deter the defendant and others from
committing similar wrongful acts.”).
336. See id. § 1D-3 (“In determining the amount of punitive damages, if any, to be
awarded, the trier of fact . . . [m]ay consider only that evidence that relates to,” among
other things, “[t]he defendant’s ability to pay punitive damages, as evidenced by its
revenues or net worth.”); Ward v. Beaton, 539 S.E.2d 30, 36 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000)

Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 2014

45

1._NELSON_FINAL_4.8.14_-_NEED_TO_PDF

4/9/2014 10:32 AM

Campbell Law Review, Vol. 36, Iss. 2 [2014], Art. 1

246

CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 36:201

however, are not intended to punish the defendant at all; rather, they are
intended to compensate the plaintiff for injuries sustained.337 The
amount of damages is significantly, if not inextricably, intertwined with
the injury itself.338 If compensatory damages are so linked with the
injury, it may be difficult to determine how to separate the evidence in
the average tort case.
That difference may explain why courts have recognized that
bifurcation “should be carefully and cautiously applied and be utilized
only in a case and at a juncture where informed judgment impels the
court to conclude that application of the rule will manifestly promote
convenience and/or actually avoid prejudice. Piecemeal litigation is not
to be encouraged.”339 The North Carolina General Assembly has not
only taken that “informed judgment” away from the judiciary, but it may
have shown a lack of informed judgment on its own part.
Furthermore, “[i]t is the consensus view that separate trials are not
available to litigants as a matter of right.”340 North Carolina’s new law
seems to disagree.341 States certainly have the right, and perhaps the
obligation, to experiment with different legislation. As Justice Brandeis
famously remarked, “[i]t is one of the happy incidents of the federal
system that a single courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as
a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without
risk to the rest of the country.”342 But it is also wise to examine past
steps before taking new steps forward. North Carolina has not studied
the effects of bifurcation of punitive damages or the effects of bifurcation
in medical malpractice cases, yet it now forges ahead with an even more
comprehensive bifurcation statute. Such experimentation is dangerous,
if not reckless.
(finding that, without bifurcation, “evidence regarding [the defendant’s] net worth was
admissible at any time during plaintiff’s case-in-chief”).
337. Collins & Aikman Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 436 S.E.2d 243,
249 (N.C. 1993) (Meyer, J., dissenting) (contrasting punitive damages with
compensatory damages, “which are awarded to compensate and make whole the injured
party” (quoting Cavin’s Inc. v. Atl. Mut. Ins. Co., 220 S.E.2d 403, 406 (N.C. Ct. App.
1975))).
338. See, e.g., Ammons v. S. Ry. Co., 52 S.E. 731, 732 (N.C. 1905) (explaining that
while punitive damages “are independent of the injury inflicted or the legal wrong
committed,” compensatory damages are “those by which the actual loss sustained is
measured and the injured party recompensed”).
339. Brown v. General Motors Corp., 407 P.2d 461, 464 (Wash. 1965).
340. Cunningham & Hutchinson, supra note 219, at 817.
341. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1A-1, Rule 42(b)(3).
342. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
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When serving as a laboratory, states should be diligent scientists
and review past studies before designing new ones. States should also be
cautioned to maintain a realistic approach to experimentation. As the
Sixth Circuit admonished, there is a risk that this trend in increased
bifurcation will create “a sterile or laboratory atmosphere in which
[liability] is parted from the reality of injury.”343
B. A Proposed Standard
That difficulty is largely avoidable. For North Carolina jurists who
are interpreting the new statute, this Article suggests implementation of
the standard from Technimark, Inc. v. Crellin, Inc.344 Under that
standard, a judge should only bifurcate the liability and damages issues if
it finds that: (1) proof of damages will be sufficiently complex, (2) there
is no potential overlap between the issues, and (3) judicial economy will
actually be served by bifurcation.345 A contrary finding of any of these
elements should constitute “good cause” to deny bifurcation under the
statute.346
For other states considering a change to their bifurcation rules, a
similar standard should be employed. However, rather than creating a
presumption in favor of bifurcation, the states should follow the lead
from federal courts and assume a single trial, but allow a party to show
that bifurcation is appropriate under the standard set out above.
Bifurcation is likely proper in some circumstances. The possibility of
inflammatory and prejudicial evidence being admitted in the liability
phase is real. But to place a presumption of bifurcation is to put the cart
before the horse. The moving party should have the burden of showing
that evidence would be prejudicial in some way or that bifurcation is
otherwise appropriate. When the liability issue is complex or witnesses
will overlap, bifurcation should be denied.347
Instead of bifurcating the litigation, a better solution is to keep the
trial in one proceeding and rely on the trier of fact to apply the
appropriate standard. Such a rule has been applied in North Carolina’s

343. In re Beverly Hills Fire Litig., 695 F.2d 207, 217 (6th Cir. 1982).
344. Technimark, Inc. v. Crellin, Inc., No. 2:96CV00986, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
15933 (M.D.N.C. Aug. 4, 1997).
345. Id. at *4–6.
346. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1A-1, Rule 42(b)(3).
347. See, e.g., R.E. Linder Steel Erection Co. v. Wedemeyer, Cernik, Corrubia, Inc.,
585 F. Supp. 1530, 1534 (D. Md. 1984).
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domestic cases.348 In that setting, “[t]he statutes contain no requirement
that the two stages in a termination of parental rights proceeding be
conducted at two separate hearings, so long as the court applies the
appropriate evidentiary standards at each of the two stages.”349 Indeed,
North Carolina presumes that the trier of fact is able to separate the two
issues and is able to consider the evidence according to the applicable
legal standards.350 Thus, the Court of Appeals of North Carolina deemed
it “well established” that “so long as the court applies the different
evidentiary standards at each of the two stages, there is no requirement
that the stages be conducted at two separate hearings.”351 In the
domestic context, “[e]vidence heard or introduced throughout the
adjudicatory stage, as well as any additional evidence, may be considered
by the court during the dispositional stage.”352 That same rule can apply
to civil cases more generally. A presumption in favor of bifurcation is
not necessary. Rather, as with most civil and criminal situations, the
decision to bifurcate should be left to the discretion of the trial judge,
and the moving party should bear the burden of demonstrating its
propriety.
If judges were omniscient and could see the future enough to
predict which cases would proceed to a damages phase, then bifurcation
would in fact promote judicial economy without prejudicing either
party. If that were the case, judges could preclude evidence of damages
altogether. In reality, however, judges are not omniscient, and they
certainly cannot predict how a jury will decide a particular case.
Although some cases are more clear-cut than others, most cases fall in
the middle.
A presumption of bifurcation in that instance is
inappropriate.
Empirical research, albeit flawed, has also demonstrated to some
degree that bifurcation is not as effective as clear jury instructions.353 At

348. See In re T.H., No. COA09-835, 2009 N.C. App. LEXIS 2357, at *10 (N.C. Ct.
App. Dec. 22, 2009).
349. Id. (citing In re Shepard, 591 S.E.2d 1, 6 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004)).
350. Id. at 11 (quoting In re White, 344 S.E.2d 36, 38 (N.C. Ct. App. 1986)).
351. In re F.G.J., 684 S.E.2d 745, 750 (N.C. Ct. App. 2009) (quoting In re Shepard,
591 S.E.2d at 6).
352. In re Blackburn, 543 S.E.2d 906, 910 (N.C. Ct. App. 2001).
353. See, e.g., Roselle L. Wissler, Katie A. Rector & Michael J. Saks, The Impact of Jury
Instructions on the Fusion of Liability and Compensatory Damages, 25 LAW & HUM. BEHAV.
125, 136 (2001) (finding that clear instructions did more to reduce damages than
bifurcation).
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least some judges agree.354 Overall, however, the research conflicts on
whether bifurcation actually helps or hinders juries.355 Rather than forge
ahead by adding multiple bifurcation statutes, additional research should
be conducted to determine the efficacy of bifurcation as well as its
prejudicial effects.
In making this determination, courts should follow the advice given
by appellate courts for the other bifurcation provisions under Rule 42.
Specifically, a trial court “should enter findings and conclusions which
clearly establish that severance is appropriate.”356 These findings and
conclusions will not only enable a more effective appellate review but
will also allow for a more general review of the efficacy and propriety of
bifurcation.
Exercising their discretion, even under a rule such as North
Carolina’s, courts would do well to consider bifurcation and its effects
carefully. Courts have identified numerous factors to consider in
making this decision. The District Court for the District of Colorado has
given the most comprehensive list:
(1) Will separate trials be conducive to expedition of the litigation and
economy? (2) Will separate trials be in furtherance of convenience to
the parties and avoid prejudice? (3) Are the issues sought to be tried
separately significantly different? (4) Are the issues triable by jury or by
the court? (5) Has discovery been directed to single trial of all issues or
separate trials? (6) Will substantially different witnesses and evidence
be required if issues are tried separately? (7) Will a party opposing
severance be significantly prejudiced if it is granted? (8) Will an unfair
advantage be afforded to a party if bifurcation is granted? (9) Will
management of trial, delineation of issues, and clarity of factual
questions be substantially enhanced by bifurcation?
(10) Will
bifurcation assist efficient judicial administration of the case?357

Courts should consider all of these factors in making the bifurcation
determination and then produce their findings and conclusions.

354. R.E. Linder Steel Erection Co. v. Wedemeyer, Cernik, Corrubia, Inc., 585 F.
Supp. 1530, 1534 (D. Md. 1984) (denying motion to bifurcate because any prejudice to
defendant “can be cured with instructions to the jury”).
355. Compare Greene et al., supra note 215 (finding that jurors were not affected by
bifurcated evidence), with Christine M. Shea Adams & Martin J. Bourgeois, Separating
Compensatory and Punitive Damage Award Decisions by Trial Bifurcation, 30 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 11 (2006) (finding that bifurcated juries were more likely to use evidence
correctly).
356. Wallace v. Evans, 298 S.E.2d 193, 196 (N.C. Ct. App. 1982).
357. Martin v. Bell Helicopter Co., 85 F.R.D. 654, 658 (D. Colo. 1980).
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VI. CONCLUSION
Whether for good or ill, “[s]eparate trials will require trial lawyers
to depart from long established modes of trial procedure.”358 Trial
lawyers in North Carolina are now faced with the task of understanding
the arguments for and against bifurcation on a deeper level than ever
before. Judges are faced with the task as well. The impact of this new
statute should not be underestimated.
“[W]hen it is seen that the split trial reduces by more than half the
cases in which personal injury plaintiffs are successful, it is apparent that
bifurcation makes a substantial change in the nature of the jury trial
itself.”359 Such a substantial change should entail careful and deliberate
thought. That kind of deliberation is missing in the passage of North
Carolina’s law. Indeed, if this change “is to be done, and if the
Constitution permits it to be done, the change should come from those
who are elected to make laws, with full awareness of what they are
doing.”360 The North Carolina General Assembly has provided no
evidence that it had full awareness of what it was doing. To the
contrary, it has proceeded to pass new laws in favor of bifurcation
without addressing or analyzing the issues described above.
To conclude, this Article respectfully disagrees with Professor
Mayers and instead argues that a unitary proceeding is not
“inherently . . . absurd.”361 Indeed, bifurcation in all cases, criminal and
civil, is the exception rather than the rule. As Professor Douglass
persuasively argues in the criminal context, “[w]e cannot
assume . . . that separation of trial and sentencing is part of the natural
order of things.”362 Judges have shown some reluctance to bifurcate for
their own reasons, but some of those reasons could include a respect for
the problems described above. That reluctance “perhaps reflects judicial
concern about bifurcation’s impact on outcomes or heightened
uneasiness about juror blindfolding.”363
Life experience is replete with examples of unitary proceedings that
may actually gain from separation. A potential student may benefit from
first determining where he should go to school and then evaluating how
much it will cost. An automobile purchaser may benefit from a similar
358. Weinstein, supra note 262, at 852.
359. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 201, § 2390.
360. Charles Alan Wright, Procedural Reform: Its Limitations and Its Future, 1 GA. L.
REV. 563, 570 (1967) (emphasis added).
361. See Mayers, supra note 1, at 389.
362. Douglass, supra note 71, at 1973.
363. Landsman et al., supra note 24, at 306.
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analysis. But there is also something to be said for gathering a complete
picture and making a determination based on the totality of the
circumstances. Bifurcation, with all of its value, distorts that picture in
the litigation context—for the parties, the judges, and the jury.
Legislatures and courts, including those in North Carolina, should be
aware of the distinct possibility of replacing “an exciting and gallant
experiment in the conduct of serious human affairs”364 with the type of
sterile laboratory discouraged by other courts.365

364. Harry Kalven, Jr., The Dignity of the Civil Jury, 50 VA. L. REV. 1055, 1055 (1964).
365. In re Beverly Hills Fire Litig., 695 F.2d 207, 217 (6th Cir. 1982) (discouraging
the creation of “a sterile or laboratory atmosphere in which causation is parted from the
reality of injury”).

Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 2014

51

